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Defensive Ability and Salary Determination in Major League Baseball
Chris Shorey
Readers: Professor Dave Findlay and Professor Tim Hubbard
Abstract
The process of salary determination in Major League Baseball (MLB) includes multiple
levels of bargaining power and performance determinants. Previous studies of MLB salary
determination have used a variety of measures of player performance. This paper examines the
effect defensive ability has on salary determination for arbitration eligible players and for free
agent players. Specifically, it will analyze player salary/contract data negotiated during the 20122015 period along with performance data from past seasons to examine the extent to which
fielding percentage, errors, and the more recently developed measures of defensive ability affect
player salary. Particular attention is paid to matching the negotiated contract/salary data to
previous seasons’ performance data in order to replicate the informational conditions known to
both the team and the player at the time of negotiation. I also included offensive performance,
player race and player ethnicity in all models. Results will examine how much emphasis is placed
on defensive ability when determining a player’s value.
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I.

Introduction
There has been much discussion of the topic about player salary determination in Major

League Baseball since the restructuring of the labor market in 1970s. This restructuring caused a
movement in bargaining power from the team to the player. As a result, different tiers of player
bargaining power have emerged. In this paper, I will examine the effects of defensive ability on
the salary determination model within Major League Baseball (MLB) in each of those tiers. This
paper will focus on two key issues surrounding that topic. First, I will examine the manner in
which salary data are correctly matched with performance data across the different tiers of player
bargaining power. Second, I will examine how the different statistical measures of defensive
ability alter the salary determination model. This research will examine the effect defensive
metrics have on the salary determination model, examining statistical measures such as fielding
percentage, defensive wins above average, defensive runs saved, errors, and defensive wins above
replacement. The primary purpose of this research is to examine how defensive statistics affect
the salary determination model.
In order to examine these two issues, I constructed a number of models that estimate
player salary based upon player bargaining power. The first model will estimate the salary of
players that are eligible for free agency, who, after obtaining six years of MLB experience, have
the ability to negotiate their salary on the open market. The second model will also examine free
agent players, however, players in this model are only free agents because they were released by
their previous team. The third model will examine all arbitration eligible players who signed
contracts that began during the 2012-2015 seasons. The fourth model will estimate the salaries for
arbitration eligible players that did not file for arbitration, despite having enough experience to do
so. The fifth model will examine arbitration eligible players who filed for arbitration and the
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salary value received at the end of the process, regardless of the outcome.1 The sixth model will
estimate the salary figure put forth by arbitration eligible players after they file for arbitration.
The seventh and final model will examine team salary offers for players that filed for arbitration.
My research is organized is the following manner: the second section of this paper will
discuss the salary determination process in the MLB, outlining how players are separated into
different levels of bargaining power. The third section will provide an inventory of defensive
statistics that exist, including how they are collected and calculated. Included in this section will
be a discussion of each of the five defensive statistics that are used in all of my model, and the
period of time for which they are available. Section four of my paper will be my review of
relevant literature and any findings that came from that review. Next, in section five, I will
discuss my three samples and the data collection process. In this section, I will also outline the
specification of my core salary determination equation. Section six of this paper will discuss the
results of my regression analysis of players in the MLB free agent market. This section will
include separate results for the two types of free agents in my sample: free agents with six or
more years of MLB experience, and free agents who have less than six years of experience and
only entered the market after being released by their previous teams. The seventh section with
discuss the results of regression analysis preformed on salary observations of players with
arbitration eligibility. This section with include five sets of regression results, including: salaries
received by all players in the sample, salaries received by players in the sample who did not file
for arbitration, salaries received by players who filed for arbitration, the salary offers put forth by
players during the arbitration process, and the salary offers put forth by teams during the
arbitration process. The eighth section will include a discussion of the results from the defensive
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Salaries in the model are either negotiated between the player and the team or decided by an
arbitration panel based upon offers made by both the player and the team.
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statistics within my regressions. The ninth section will outline my overall conclusions from my
regression analysis, with special attention paid to the area of interest of my research: the effect
defensive statistics have on player salary.
II.

Salary Determination in the MLB
For much of baseball’s history, player bargaining power was virtually nonexistent. The

reserve clause was implemented in the 1800s, restricting a player’s ability to negotiate his own
contract. Until 1975, the player’s original team retained the exclusive rights to a player’s services
for the duration of the player’s career. This meant that players were not allowed to negotiate
contracts with other teams, and the player’s original team controlled movement from team to
team. This system was altered following the creation of the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), an entity that has worked to increase the amount of bargaining power
players have since its creation. In 1973, following a labor strike, players gained the ability to file
for arbitration and have an independent third party determine the player’s salary for the following
year. In 1975, Peter Seitz, a federal judge at the time, ruled that the reserve clause guaranteed a
team exclusive rights over a player’s services only for the first six years of a player’s career. This
ruling legalized free agency, a player’s ability to let teams bid for his services on the open market.
The 1975 ruling led to the current system of player contract determination. The MLB
currently has a three-tier system of bargaining, with bargaining power dependent on a player’s
MLB service. MLB service is the measure of how long a player has spent on a MLB roster, and it
is measured in days and years, with 172 days equaling one year. For the first three years of a
player’s Major League career, he is considered arbitration ineligible and subject to a minimum
salary depending upon their minor or major league status. During this time, teams control a
player’s rights exclusively. After logging three years of Major League service, a player is
considered arbitration eligible. This means that in the case when the player feels his team is
4

undervaluing his services, that player can take his case to an independent arbitrator, who will help
the team and the player decide the salary player will receive in exchange for his services. Some
players that have less than three years of MLB experience are eligible for arbitration. These
players are known as “Super Two” players, and they are defined as players that have more than
two, but less than three years of experience. In order to qualify as a “Super Two” player, a player
must have at least 86 days of experience in the previous season and rank in the top 22% of all
“Super Two” eligible players in terms of service time. The cutoff for “Super Two” status in 20142015 offseason was 2 years and 133 days of Major League service. This means that if a player
spent 2 years and 133 days on a Major League roster by the end of the 2014 season, then that
player would be considered arbitration eligible.
The arbitration process in Major League Baseball is meant to give players a chance to
have some control over their compensation. The process begins with the player’s original team
tendering him an offer for his services in the next season. If the player deems this offer to be
insufficient, he can decide to file for arbitration. The deadline for this to happen is typically
during the second week in January. After the player files for arbitration, both the player’s team
and the player will submit a value for the player’s services in the following season. These two
values are sent on to the arbitration panel. The player and the team can continue negotiations
throughout this process. If the two parties are unable to reach a deal by early February, then there
is an arbitration hearing. During this hearing, the arbitration panel with decide between the
player’s value and the value put forth by the player’s team. The value that the panel picks will be
the player’s compensation for the next season. The arbitration panel considers factors such as
player performance, player leadership, public appeal, and comparable major league salaries when
making their decision between the two values (MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement). A player
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will go through this process for determining their salary until he reaches six years of MLB
service, at which time he is eligible to become a free agent.
The third-tier of player bargaining power is free agency. After six years of Major League
Baseball service, a player is allowed to enter the open market and have teams bid competitively
for his services. The player’s former team can offer a qualifying offer, of an amount equal to the
average of the top-125 player salaries in the league. If the former team offers a qualifying offer
and the player signs with another team, the former team receives a draft pick as compensation.
The process is as follows: following the conclusion of the World Series all players with expired
contracts and more than six years of MLB service become free agents. During the first five days
following the conclusion of the World Series, a player can either negotiate a new contract with his
former team or discuss the possibility of playing elsewhere with other teams. It is during this time
that the player’s former club is able to make a qualifying offer. If a qualifying offer is not made,
then following the fifth day the player will enter the open market, able to negotiate a new contract
with any team. If a qualifying offer is made, then that player has seven days to accept that offer. If
he does not, then movement to a new team could prove costly, as a new team would have to send
a draft pick as compensation to the player’s original team. A player does not necessarily have to
have six years of MLB service to become a free agent. If a player is released by his original team
prior to his sixth year of service, he is granted free agency as well.
Free agency has had a great impact on player salaries since its implementation in the
1970s. Since 1975, the highest salary in the league has increase by nearly 121 times, while the
average salary has increased by 93 times (Haupert 2014). Player salary continues to increase
along with player contract length, which now includes multi-year deals for guaranteed money.
Players are now paid far more than ever before, and salaries continue to trend in an upward
direction. Competitively bidding for the rights to a player through free agency completely
6

changed the landscape of how a player’s salary is determined and the factors considered when the
salaries are being negotiated.
III.

Defensive Statistics

This section will include a description of different measures of defensive ability, including
how they are calculated and how long they have existed. Defensive statistics have evolved over
time, and there is a lot more data available now than there was twenty years ago.
A. Official MLB Statistics- Errors, Assists and Fielding Percentage
There are multiple ways to measure defensive ability in Major League Baseball. Major
League Baseball collects a few statistics officially, including errors, putouts, assists, and fielding
percentage. An error is defined as, “a statistic charged against a fielder whose action has assisted
the team on offense”(MLB Official Rulebook). The calculation of an error is left to the opinion
of an official scorer, who gives the ruling on all plays in the field. This means that the standard for
what is and what is not an error is subjective. Putouts and assists are the number of observations
when a player makes a play in the field. A putout is, “is a statistic credited to a fielder whose
action causes the out of a batter-runner or runner,” while an assist is, “is a statistic credited to a
fielder whose action contributes to a batter-runner or runner being put out” (MLB Official
Rulebook). These three statistics combine to form a players fielding percentage. A player’s
fielding percentage is equal the number of putouts and assists divided by putouts and assists plus
errors. A fielding percentage close to one typically corresponds with a high-level of defensive
ability. Fielding percentage, along with values for putouts, assists, and errors, are available back
through the 1871 season.
B. Range FactorRange factor is a statistic calculated using the same components as fielding percentage. Range
factor is equal to putouts plus assists per defensive inning played or per games played. It
7

calculates the number of players a player makes per inning. This statistic is also available through
the 1871 season.

C. Ultimate Zone RatingUltimate zone rating is a defensive statistic that puts a run value to defensive ability. It is an
aggregation of the following four stats: outfield arm runs, double play runs, range runs, and error
runs, each of which I have in the disaggregated form. To calculate each of those stats, player
performance is compared to league average. A fielder of average ability would possess a UZR of
0. UZR is available back to the 2002 season. This stat does not include a positional adjustment,
therefore, positions like 2B and SS are more likely to have double play runs than OF, among other
possible forms of bias. This is a value, not a percentage, thus the career totals are aggregate from
season to season. A fielder of average ability would possess a UZR of 0, as this would indicate
that the player makes almost all routine plays, or plays that a player of average ability would
make, within his “zone.” A player of above average fielding ability would possess a UZR of +5.
UZR data is available back to the 2002 season, however, it is not available for the position of
catchers.
D. Defensive Runs Saved (DRS)Similar to UZR, Defensive Runs Saved measures the number of runs a player saves with his
defensive ability compared to a player of average ability at the position. It is available back to
2003, and its algorithms are preserved but not shared by the organization Fielding Bible. Fielding
Bible is a sabermetric organization that calculates unique statistics to evaluate a player’s
defensive ability. DRS is the primary statistic they calculate. This statistic does not include a
positional adjustment. This means that more difficult positions, such as shortstop, are more likely
to have more defensive runs saved than an easier position, such as first base. It is an aggregation
8

of the following: rSB (stolen bases runs saved), rBU (bunts run saved), rGDP (double play runs
saved), rARM (outfield arm runs saved), rHR (robbed home runs runs saved), and rPM (plus
minus runs saved).
E. Defensive Wins Above Replacement (DWAR)This statistic converts defensive ability into win shares, and compares the ability of an average
player to a player’s defensive ability. It does this by determining the number of runs a player
saves with his defensive ability relative to a player of average defensive ability. From there, it is
calculated by dividing the number of runs a player saves by the number of runs necessary to
generate a win. This statistic includes a positional adjustment, which means it weigh different
components of calculation relative to the position a player plays. DWAR’s computation is
dependent on play-by-play data. For this reason, it is only available for all players through the
1974 season. Incomplete data is available for the 1938-1973 seasons.
F. Defensive Runs Above Average (DEF)This statistic measures a player’s defensive value relative to the league average. It calculates the
number of runs a player’s defensive ability saves compared to a player of average defensive
ability, and it includes positional adjustment. This statistic is available through the 2003 season,
and its calculation is based upon play-by-play data.

IV.

Literature Review
In reviewing relevant literature, I looked for two key indicators within each model. These

indicators pertained to how economists dealt with two different statistical components of their
salary determination model. The first involves defensive ability, an ability with very few metrics
prior to the revolution of “sabermetrics” in the 1980s. The second is the manner in which authors
work to match salary negotiation with player performance measures. When a salary is negotiated,
9

it is negotiated based upon a player’s performance prior to when a player signed the contract. In
some studies, for example Stone and Pantuosco (2008), the model does not match performance
statistics to when the salary was signed, but rather look to explain how previous statistics match
up with the salary received in a given year. In the model mentioned above, the economists run a
regression for all salaries in the 2003 season, but some of the salaries received in that year were
the result of contracts signed prior to the 2003 offseason. For this reason, 2002 performance data
would be insufficient to explain salaries received in 2003, as the contracts were signed, in some
cases, prior to the 2002 season. This is important because in actual terms, contracts are negotiated
in response to past performance, which is why statistics from the previous year are not necessarily
going to give the best estimate of a salary negotiated three-years ago as part of a multi-year
contract.
Salary determination models have evolved significantly since Gerald Scully (1974)
introduced the first modern salary determination model in 1974, a few years prior to the transition
to the modern Major League Baseball (MLB) labor market structure. Scully’s original model
examined team revenue, player performance, and team performance. In order to evaluate player
performance for position players he included the statistical measures of slugging percentage and
strikeout to walk ratios. He did not include a defensive metric, and since free agency as it stands
today was nonexistent at the time, he did not match the statistical measures to when the player
salaries were negotiated, because in some cases he analyzed multi-year contracts and used
performance data from the 1969 season to determine salaries received in 1970. This is insufficient
because in those cases, 1969 performance data was not available to the player or the team when
those multi-year contracts were signed. The salary determination model has evolved significantly
since this original model, but those two components appear inconsistently in the post-Scully
models. In the 22 papers that I have examined while researching for this work, eight some
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included measures of defensive ability, and 11 worked to attempt to match player performance
measures with the time when player salary was determined.
Link and Yosifov (2012) sought to examine if players are willing to trade-off salary
amount for contract length in Major League Baseball. They did this by examining the 1025 free
agent contracts signed between 1984-1994 and 2003-2006. Their model for salary determination
included measures of player performance, contract length, player experience, team revenue and
player race. The variables they examined for player performance were a three-year average of
slugging percentage prior to free agent negotiations, and a three-year average of at-bats per year
prior to free agent negotiations. They also built a second model that uses win shares as the
measure of player performance instead of at-bats and slugging percentage. They found that there
was no significant difference between the models and in both models there was a statistically
significant trade-off between salary amount and contract length. This meant that free agent
players were typically willing to accept lower salaries in return for longer guaranteed contracts.
Link and Yosifov did not include defensive metrics in either of their models. Their model
did work to align performance metrics with the time of contract negotiation. They did this by
focusing on free agent contract negotiations and examining the three-year averages of
performance measures in the period leading up to the negotiations. While this allowed proper
contract negotiation alignment with performance measures, it did limit the size of Link and
Yosifov’s sample size, causing them to have to expand the range of time they examined to a
period of 14 years. Their research sought to only examine free agency, and in doing so, left out
the other tiers of negotiation in the Major League labor market.
Link and Yosifov’s research brings forth a third important component. Player and team
behavior can change over time. Their results indicated that players were willing to trade-off
contract length for salary amount in the 1980’s but not as much during the 1990’s and 2000’s.
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This brings forth a concept worth examining. How did player and team negotiating behavior
change over time, and did the statistical measures used as explanatory variables vary in level of
significance over time. Link and Yosifov never attempt to answer this question. However, their
work will be relevant to future research that examines the effect certain types of performance
variables, such as defensive performance variables, have on salary determination over time.
Rockerbie (2009) examined whether a greater supply of free-agent baseball players at a
certain position has an effect on negotiated free-agent salaries. In order to do this, he examined
303 free agent salaries, by position, negotiated between the 1997 and 2002 seasons. He then built
a salary determination model that included measures of player performance, team wins in the
previous year, team payroll in the previous year, and the number of free agents available between
seasons. The performance metrics he used in his model were slugging percentage, fielding
percentage, and games played, all in the previous year. His results suggest that free-agent player
ability affected player salary for the positions of shortstops and catchers, but not for other
positions. He hypothesized that Major League teams tend to carry more players of the other
positions that can easily cover the loss of one to free agency, but do not for the positions of
shortstop and catcher.
Rockerbie included the defensive metric of fielding percentage in his model. His
reasoning for doing so was because it is a relatively uniform metric across positions, and his
model examined each position independently. The use of fielding percentage as a statistical
measure of defensive ability is a method that has met high levels of critique in recent years,
primarily because it is a subjective statistic (fangraphs.com, 2015). Fielding percentage is left to
the opinion of the official scorer, as errors are judged by this impartial entity that decides whether
a defensive play should be made on a consistent basis. Fielding percentage is also an imperfect
statistical measure of performance because it measures the number of times an attempted
12

defensive play is made. It fails to factor in superior defensive ability that allows more defensive
plays to be made through a player’s range. For example, a player like Derek Jeter, who had
limited range throughout his career, posted a high fielding percentage due to his ability to make
plays that he was able to reach (fangraphs.com, 2015). Fielding percentage merely measures
conversion rates on attempted defensive plays. Rockerbie’s decision to include fielding
percentage in his model was an interesting choice on that basis. That being said, fielding
percentage is also one of the few official defensive statistics measures Major League Baseball
collects.
Rockerbie also attempted to match player performance metrics with the time when salaries
were negotiated by focusing on only free-agent contracts negotiated between 1997 and 2002. By
examining only new contracts, he was able to ensure the performance metrics were relevant at the
time of negotiations and thus match them to the salaries received by the player. His use of only
free agent salaries did, however, work to limit his sample size as the number of free agent
contracts signed from 1997-2002 was far less than the number of total new contracts signed
between 1997 and 2002. It also worked to limit his analysis to only one-tier of bargaining power.
Miller (2000) examined the difference between player salaries negotiated in final offer
arbitration and salaries negotiated in free agency. He did this by building a model for salary
determination and comparing the effects on the two-levels of bargaining power. This model
included variables for player performance, player durability, and team winning percentage in the
previous year. He analyzed cases of free agency and arbitration eligible players between the years
of 1991 and 1993. The measures he used for player performance were runs created and defensive
runs saved. Miller found that contracts negotiated under final offer arbitration, where an
arbitration panel decides between a player’s offer and the team’s offer, were different than
contracts negotiated under free agency. Miller noted that the results follow his hypothesis, as
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players have more bargaining power under free agency than they do under the final offer
arbitration system. The study also found that final offer arbitration salaries are dependent upon
free agency salaries, as arbitration panels factor free agent salaries of other players into their
arbitration decisions.
This model incorporates a defensive measure of performance in the form of defensive runs
saved. This metric examines how many runs better or worse a player is compared to an average
player at that position. It is considered by many sabermetricians to be a defensive metric that
captures a player’s total defensive ability (fangraphs.com, 2015). Miller’s efforts to match
performance measures with the time when the contract is negotiated are also of note. He does this
matching by examining performance data from the year leading up to when the salary is
determined, and by only examining the 303 new free-agent contracts and new cases of final offer
arbitration for the 1991-1994 seasons. His model includes a variable for what tier of bargaining
power a player falls into, whether it be free agency eligible or arbitration eligible.
Marburger (1994) examined the relationship between bargaining power and the structure of
Major League Baseball contracts. He did this by examining the three-tiers of bargaining power
that exist in Major League Baseball, and the effect each has on player salary amounts. These
three-tiers of bargaining power include: non-arbitration eligible players, players eligible for
arbitration, and players eligible for free agency. In order to do this, he built a model that examined
player performance, player salary in the current season, and player experience. In order to account
for player performance, he included the measures of home runs in the previous season, runs batted
in (RBI) in the previous season, runs scored in the previous season, player fielding percentage
divided by the average fielding percentage at the player’s position, career runs scored, career
RBIs, and career home runs. He ran three separate regressions based on a player’s bargaining
power: arbitration ineligible, arbitration eligible, and free agency eligible. His results indicate that
14

the arbitration process does not usually result in a player being paid the amount he would receive
if he were a free agent. This shows that player bargaining power plays a significant role in the
salary determination.
The Marburger model does use a measure of defensive ability in the form of fielding
percentage compared to the league average at the player’s position. He did not explain his use of
this metric, and while the statistic of fielding percentage does have its pros and cons, Marburger’s
efforts to compare the metric to a league average is worth noting. This alteration does work to
examine how performance in that metric alone affects salary determination. The significance of
the measure in the model differs depending on bargaining power. In the arbitration eligible model,
the coefficient for fielding percentage compared to league average is significant at the five
percent level. In the other two models, fielding percentage compared to league average is not
significant at the five percent level. Marburger’s model does not match the performance metrics
with the time of salary negotiation. In his work, he examines all of the player salaries of the 1992
season, regardless of when they were negotiated. In the cases of players that were arbitration
eligible this would in some cases present a match with the performance measures. However, in
the other two tiers of negotiating power, free agents and non-arbitration eligible players, such a
match does not exist. While the model does sort players by bargaining power eligibility, it merely
examines their salaries over that time instead only examining new contracts signed in the time
period studied.
Brown (2008) examined what factors led to the determination of final offer arbitration
salaries from a third party arbitrator in Major League Baseball. In order to do this, he examined
all 2681 instances of contract negotiations that led to a third party arbitrator between the years of
1984 and 2007. Brown found the key component that differed from players that went on to final
offer arbitration and those that did not was the size of the difference between offers between
15

players and the teams with which they were negotiating. He also examined the reasoning behind
why players filed for arbitration, and the number of times within their five-year window prior to
becoming free agent eligible that they did so. His model included many different components
including player experience, player performance, team performance, and a dummy variable for
player position. For player performance, he examined the measures of on-base percentage plus
slugging for the two-year period prior to negotiations, at-bats per year for the two-year period
prior to negotiations, number of All-Star game appearances, number of Silver Slugger awards,
and number of Gold Glove awards. His results showed that the highest variable correlated with
final offer arbitration of the variables he examined was at-bats per year. This would indicate that
player durability, the ability to play on a regular basis, is a significant factor in the salary
determination model for final offer arbitration.
Brown attempted to match his performance variables with the time of contract negotiation
by examining only cases of final offer arbitration. This allowed him to examine how a player was
preforming at the point of negotiation, and how the player was compensated for that performance.
However, by narrowing his scope of examination to one level of bargaining power, he also had to
widen the range of dates of the data he observed. He examined final offer arbitration data that
ranged from 1984 to 2007. For this reason, he ran four separate regressions for five-year
increments of time. He did this to factor in changes in the overall salary determination landscape
over time. A five-year range is still a period of time in which performance measure’s effect on
salary determination can change, which made his choice, which appears arbitrary, to calculate a
model for a range of years noteworthy.
In terms of defensive performance measures used, Brown chose to incorporate only a
measure for number of Gold Gloves won at the time of negotiations. The incorporation of this
measure proved to be an interesting choice, as the mean number of Gold Gloves won in the 2,693
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cases of final offer arbitration he observed was 0.11. This indicates that not many players win
Gold Glove awards in their first five years in the Major Leagues. However, it is of note that the
use of Gold Glove awards won at time of negotiation is statistically significant at the one-percent
level in two of Brown’s four models.
Holmes (2011) examines how players are compensated based upon their race. He uses a
salary determination model that incorporates a variety of different variables including: player
performance, team revenue, population of the city the player signs his contract in, and race. In
order to measure player performance, Holmes uses the measures of defensive zone rating, stolen
base runs, on base percentage, slugging percentage, and the number of Gold Glove awards a
player has won for their defensive ability. It is noteworthy that, similar to Brown (2010), Holmes
chose not to include any official defensive statistics in his analysis. However, he did include an
aggregated statistic known as zone rating. Zone rating is calculated by examining the number of
balls hit in a player’s zone, and comparing that figure to the number of plays a player makes. The
measure is relatively new compared to other statistics and data only exists for players since 1987.
Holmes does not explain his choice of zone rating over other defensive measures, however, he
does conclude that the reason other salary determination models typically find evidence of salary
discrimination among race is their failure to include measures of defensive and running ability.
A distinguishing feature of this study is the manner in which the author attempted to
match performance measures with the date of signing a new contract. In constructing his model,
Holmes only examined the 511 players who signed new contracts as free agents between the years
of 1998 and 2006. Holmes discussed how free agent contracts tend to be influenced more by
recent performance than their total body of work. Holmes examined the statistical measures of
player slugging percentage and on base percentage of the three years prior to signing new free
agent contracts. He did this instead of only looking at previous year or career to date figures.
17

Holmes believes that teams are more likely to evaluate performance over the past three years
when determining a free agent salary offer. This method of evaluation is noteworthy because it is
unique when compared to other salary determination models, as only four of the 24 models
examined followed this method.
An examination of previous literature shows evidence that salary determination models
have attempted, albeit on an inconsistent basis, to incorporate defensive metrics of player
performance into the model. Scholars are far from a consensus on both the mere presence of a
metric and, in the case of a defensive metric’s presence, which metric to use. The second problem
is not unique to defensive metrics, as there is variation across the models on how to best
incorporate offensive ability. Previous models offer differing suggestions to the solution of this
problem, including the incorporation of fielding percentage, defensive runs saved, zone rating,
and the number of Gold Glove awards won, but no definitive trend has emerged. The problem
surrounding salary matching to player performance is similar in nature. Economists have dealt
with the issue of data matching in unique ways, including building models that focus solely on
new free agent contracts or models that examine arbitration settlements, but again, no consensus
or definitive trend has emerged. My research focus on these two areas, including finding the
important data nuances to properly match salary data with player performance data in salary
determination models, and examining different defensive statistical measures of player
performance, how each one influences the salary determination model, and how that influence has
changed over time.
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V.

Data

A. Sample
The data I collected consist of all arbitration eligible and free-agent eligible players that
signed contracts that would begin during the 2012-2015 seasons. This window was chosen due to
the implementation of a new collective bargaining agreement following the end of the 2011
season. However, there are nine players in my sample that signed contracts prior to the
implementation of the new collective bargaining agreement. These salary observations
represented situations in which players signed a contract extension with their original teams that
took effect once their previous contracts expired. For example, Todd Helton signed a contract
extension prior to the beginning of the 2010 season, despite being under contract through the end
of the 2011 season. This means that his contract extension began in the 2012 season, and for that
reason is included in the sample. With the exception of the nine players that meet this criteria, all
of the observations in my sample followed the contract negotiation guidelines set forth by the
2011 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement. This means that the process of salary determination
is consistent for all of the other players in the sample, as these processes, which are discussed in
detail in section 3 of this paper, remained the same for all contracts negotiated following the
conclusion of the 2011 season, until the conclusion of the 2016 season. My sample includes all
new contracts signed by players that were either eligible for arbitration or free agency during this
time period, along with any contract extensions that were signed prior to the end of the 2011
season, but began in the 2012-2015 seasons.
Following this criteria of selection, the sample is sorted by player bargaining power. This
means that the sample is broken into sub-samples based on the amount of MLB service each
player has at the time each contract is signed. There are 260 observations of free agent contracts
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signed by position players for the 2012-2015 seasons.2 Over the same period of time there are 320
observations of position players who were eligible for arbitration for the 2012-2015 seasons. Of
these 320 observations, 235 are players who elected not to file for arbitration and signed contracts
with their original team through independent negotiations. The remaining 85 players filed for
arbitration, exchanging figures with their original team. This means that for these 85 players, I
obtained three separate salary figures: the player offers, the team offers, and the settled salary
amounts. Of those 85 observations, nine players had their salary determined by an arbitration
panel. Of the nine players who had their salaries determined by an arbitration panel, four had the
panel side with the player and five had the panel side with the team. The remaining 57
observations in the sample are players that were arbitration eligible, having less than six years of
MLB service, but were released by their original team and thus entered the free agent market.
B. Chow Test Results
1. Free Agent and Arbitration Eligible Player Samples
The results of the chow test conducted between the free agent and arbitration eligible
player samples suggest that there is a structural break in the data between the two samples. This
means that the variables that comprise the specification of the core equation have a different
impact on free agent salaries and arbitration eligible player salaries. The f-test indicates that the
difference in impact is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This means that the
salary determination equation for free agents and arbitration eligible players must be examined
separately, as the performance variables affect salary differently based upon which process the
player uses to determine his salary. This finding is in line with intuition, as bargaining power

2

I exclude pitchers from the sample due to the fact that the determinants of their salary varies
greatly with the determinants of a positon player’s salary. This is because the skill set of a pitcher
is far different from that of a position player, thus the specification of a salary determination
equation would be very different.
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varies greatly between these two groups. Free agent players have the ability to negotiate in the
open market, whereas, arbitration eligible players are restricted to negotiating with their original
team.
As opposed to analyzing the model as a whole, when analyzing the variables on an
individual level, the results indicate that there is a significantly significant difference of the
impact of each variable on salary, with the exception of OBP. According to the results of the
Chow test, OBP does not have a different impact on salary across the models that is statistically
significant. The same is true of the constant estimates from each sample. These estimates fail to
show a statistically significant structural break in the data. This suggests that, all else fixed, the
starting point of salary negotiation does not vary significantly between the two samples. This
finding also indicates that the error term is representing similar sources of variance in salary
across the two samples. This makes sense given that the specification of the two models does not
differ across samples.
2. Released Free Agent and Free Agent Player Samples
The results of the Chow test run on estimates from the released free agent and free agent
with six or more years of experience samples indicate that there is a statistically significant break
in the salary data between the two samples. This finding is in line with intuition given the
differences in player quality across the two groups. Players in the released free agent sample were
released by their former teams, which indicates that they held little value to those teams, and as
such their salary determination equation should differ to the equation for players in the other
sample, which included free agent players with more than six years of MLB experience. The
players in the non-released free agent sample were not released by their former teams, instead
choosing to enter the open market to negotiate a value for their services. Thus, demand for players
in the two samples varies greatly.
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3. Released Free Agent and Arbitration Eligible Player Samples
The results of the Chow test run between the release free agent and arbitration eligible
player samples suggests that, at the 5% level of significance, there is a statistically significant
structural break in the data between the two samples. This result is in line with intuition, given the
difference in the process of salary determination between the two samples and the different levels
of bargaining power between players in the two samples. Released free agents, while not
necessarily in high demand, are able to negotiate a contract with any team, while arbitration
eligible players are only able to negotiate with their original team. On an individual level, the
results for most of the variables in the indicate that the difference in impact across models is not
significant, with the primary exception being the constant estimates. These estimates represent
where the structural break occurs between the two samples.
C. Contract Data Collection and Matching
One of the focuses of this research is to determine how to properly match player contract
data with player performance data for the purposes of building a salary determination model. As
outlined in my review of preexisting literature, a number of studies have examined player salary
as an independent figure, determined on a year-to-year basis, without taking into account that
salaries can be negotiated as part of a multi-year agreement between the team and the player. For
this reason, it is insufficient to merely examine a player’s salary when building a salary
determination model. Player salary is not determined on a year-to-year basis in the MLB. Players
and teams can engage in multi-year contracts, which is broadly defined as an agreed upon dollar
amount in exchange for multiple years of a player’s service. Due to this fact, when I collected my
data, I found that it would be insufficient to merely pull salary data as the measure of player value
I would be examining. Instead, I pulled data of player contracts and from this contract data,
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calculated the average annual value over the life of contract to use as the dependent variable in
my analysis. For example, if a player signed a two-year contract with a total value of $10 million,
the average annual value would be $5 million.
Multi-year contracts create problems with matching performance statistics, because the
salary a player receives in years after the first year of the contract are determined based upon the
player’s performance when the contract was initially signed. For example, if a player signed a
two-year contract before the 2012 season, the player’s performance during the 2012 season did
not play a role in determining the salary that the player would receive in 2013. In this example the
player’s 2013 salary was determined prior to the 2012 season. It is for this reason that when
matching player performance to the salary the player would receive, it is insufficient to analyze
only the salary a player receives from year-to-year. These salaries are determined based upon
player contracts, which in turn are determined based upon the information available to both the
team and the player at the time of negotiation.
In order to correctly match performance data with player salary, I began by collecting
data on all of the contracts negotiated to begin during the 2012-2015 period. Important to note, at
this point in my data collection, the contracts were sorted based upon when they began. This
means that I had not yet obtained the data on when the contracts were actually negotiated, this
step would take place later in the process. Recall that in the previous section I noted that some
contract extensions were negotiated prior to the 2012-2015 period, despite beginning in this
period. In short, I obtained the contract data based on when the contract took effect, not based
upon when the contract was signed. All of the contract data were obtained from Cot’s Contracts, a
section of Baseballprospectus.com. This was done by extracting the contract data for all players
on MLB Opening Day rosters for all 30 MLB teams. I did this for all four seasons from 20122015 and I separated the data by year. This means that I then obtained a list of contracts that were
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active during the 2012 season, 2013 season, 2014 season, and 2015 season respectively,
regardless of when the contracts began. From these lists, I eliminated all contracts that began prior
to the year in question. For example, from the list of 2012 contracts, I eliminated all contracts that
began prior to the 2012 season, such as a multi-year contract signed in 2011 or before. This was
an important step because it eliminated possible duplicate observations from the sample. Without
taking this step, a multi-year contract signed in 2012 would have appeared again in the sample
under contracts signed for 2013. I also eliminated all contracts signed for pitchers, as my research
focuses only on position players.
Following the elimination of the extraneous data, I combined the four lists into one, and
sorted the players by MLB service time. The MLB service time figures in the dataset represented
the amount of time the player had spent on a MLB roster at the beginning of the season in
question. Thus for contracts signed for the 2012 season, the MLB service time figure I had for the
player corresponded to the amount of service that player had at the end of the 2011 season. This is
important because that is the figure that determined the process the player was eligible to go
through for salary determination: whether it be arbitration or free agency.
Once the data set of player contracts that began during the 2012-2015 period had been
compiled, I next split the players into groups based on player bargaining power. Players with six
years or more of MLB service were placed into the free agent group. Players with less than six
years of experience but more than the “Super Two” cutoff amounts were placed into the
arbitration eligible group. The “Super Two” cutoffs used were 2.146 years for arbitration eligible
player contracts signed for the 2012 season, 2.140 for contracts signed for the 2013 season, 2.122
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for contracts signed for the 2014 season, and 2.133 for contracts signed for the 2015 season.3 The
remaining contracts, those for players with less service time than the “Super Two” cutoff, were
eliminated from the data set, as their salary is set exclusively by their team subject to the league
minimum.
1. Free Agent Contract and Performance Data Matching
The free agent group data had a final step of preparation before performance statistics
could be matched. I went through the 260 observations and collected the date that each contract
was signed. This was an important step because the contract data I pulled were of contracts
negotiated to begin during the 2012-2015 seasons, without indication of the actual date those
contracts were negotiated and signed. It is possible that a contract that begins in a given season
could have been negotiated and signed years in the past. As previously mentioned, I identified
nine observations in my sample that met this criterion. The signing date of each contract was
essential to allow me to identify these contract observations. It was important for me to identify
these contracts within my dataset because performance data would have to be adjusted to reflect a
player’s statistics at the time when the contract was signed. This means that the player’s
performance data in data set had to be matched to reflect his career through the end of the nearest
full season prior to when the contract was signed. This adjustment had to be made for 39
observations in the sample.4

3

MLB service times are not explicitly in years, but rather in years and days. For example, a
service time of 2.122 would be equal to 2 years and 122 days. A full MLB season is considered to
be 172 days
4
When adjusting the performance data of players who signed extensions prior to the end of the
year before the contract would take effect, partial season data was not used. This means that if a
player signed a contract extension during the 2011 season that would begin in the 2012 season,
data from the 2011 season were not used.
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Once the dates that the contracts were signed were determined, data were matched to
reflect a player’s career performance through the last season prior to signing the contract. This
means that for all players that signed contracts during the off-season between the 2011 and 2012
seasons, the performance data were chosen to reflect the player’s career up to the end of the 2011
season. This was done for all players in the sample. The statistics matched included basic batting
statistics, basic fielding statistics, advanced fielding metrics, advanced player value metrics, and
race5 and ethnicity data.
2. Arbitration Eligible Contract and Performance Data Matching
The process for matching arbitration eligible player’s contracts and performance data was
largely done in a similar manner as the observations in the free agent group. The first step was to
analyze the “Super Two” players in the dataset and make sure that the cutoff dates were reflective
of whether or not the player was arbitration eligible with less than three years of service. Next,
each observation was analyzed to determine whether the player accepted his team’s tender,
negotiated a contract extension with his team, filed for arbitration, or was released. There were 57
players in the dataset who were released by their original team, and thus entered the free agent
market to sign a contract with a new team. These players were removed from the arbitration
eligible dataset and placed in their own group, because their salary determination process was not
the same as the rest of the players in the arbitration eligible group. For players that signed
extensions with their original teams, the date that the extension was negotiated and signed was
collected so that adjustments could be made to the performance stats, if necessary. This was
process was completed the same way it was for the free agent players.

5

Race was determined by multiple individuals analyzing a photo of a player and determining
whether or not the player was perceived to be a player of color
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For players who filed for arbitration, values from the arbitration process were recorded. These
values included the amount put forth by the player, the amount put forth by the team, and the
outcome of the process. Once this was done, performance statistics were matched in the same way
as they were matched for free agent contracts. Performance statistics represented each player’s
career prior to when the contract was signed. For players who went through the arbitration
process to determine their salary for the 2012 season, performance statistics represent the player’s
career through the end of the 2011 season.
D. Performance Data
Most of the performance data were collected from the Sean Lehman database, which is an
aggregation of all data collected by Major League Baseball. Performance data was also collected
from BaseballReference and FanGraphs. As previously noted, the performance data reflect a
player’s career prior to when the contract was signed and negotiated. This was done because that
data represents the information available to both the team and the player regarding the player’s
value at the time the contract was negotiated. From the Sean Lehman database, the following
offensive player data were acquired: games played, at bats, runs scored, hits, doubles, triples,
home runs, runs batted in, stolen bases, number of times a player is caught stealing, walks,
strikeouts, intentional walks, number of times a player was hit by a pitch, sacrifice hits (bunts and
ground balls), sacrifice flies, and the number of times a player grounded into a double play. The
following defensive player data were collected from the Sean Lehman database: defensive innings
played, putouts, assists, errors, and double plays.6 From Baseball Reference the following
statistics were collected: wins above replacement, offensive wins above replacement, and
defensive wins above replacement. From FanGraphs, the following statistics were collected:

6

The catcher position specific statistics of passed balls, runners caught stealing, runners allowed
to steal, and wild pitches were also collected.
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defensive runs saved (DRS), ultimate zone rating (UZR), and defensive runs above average
(DEF).
The FanGraphs data had to be adjusted, as the advanced defensive metrics were only
available starting with the 2003 season.7 A number of players in the free agent dataset began
playing prior to the 2003 season. Thus, when adjusting these statistics on a per season basis, a
separate statistic of adjusted player experience had to be calculated. The first adjusted player
experience measure is equal to the number of seasons a player played from 2002 on, and it was
used to calculate UZR on a per year basis.8 DRS and DEF per season were calculated using
another adjusted player experience statistic, which represented the number of seasons the player
played from 2003 on. I will discuss my reason for adjusting these statistics in the next section.
Race and ethnicity data were also collected. The race dummy variable in my data is based
on the evaluation of multiple people to determine whether or not the player was a person of color
based upon a photo of the player.9 The ethnicity dummy variable in my data denotes whether a
player was born in a Latin American country or not. Home countries of players in the sample that
indicated a Hispanic ethnicity included: Venezuela, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico,
Panama, and Cuba. The evaluation of whether or not a player was a person of color was only
made for players not born in a Latin American country. Thus, a non-white player would not show
up in the data as both Black and Hispanic, but instead as one or the other.

7

UZR was only available back to the 2002 season
UZR data are not available for catchers. UZR data were collected to examine models without
players that play the catcher position. This would serve as a robustness check.
9
The evaluation of whether or not a player was a person of color was only made for players not
born in a Latin American country. Thus, a non-white player would not show up in the data as both
Black and Hispanic, but instead as one or the other.
8
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E. Model
The core salary determination model used was as follows:
Salary= β0 + β1 (Slugging Percentage) + β2 (On-base percentage) + β3 (At bats per year)
β4 (Stolen Bases per year) + β5 (Middle Infielder Position dummy) +
β6 (Latin American dummy) + β7 (Black dummy) + β8 (Total Seasons) +
β9 (Defensive metric)
1. Non-defensive variables in the Model
a. Slugging percentageSlugging percentage (SLG) measures a player’s ability to hit the ball for power. It is
calculated by dividing a player’s total bases by at bats. At bats is the number of times a player
either creates an unproductive out or gets a hit. 10 Total bases is the number of bases a player
collects from a hit, and is calculated by adding the number of singles a player hits, the number of
doubles a player hits times two, the number of triples a player hits times three and the number of
home runs a player hits times four. Values for slugging percentage were calculated using the
statistics from the Sean Lehman dataset. SLG is a measure of efficiency, which means it
represents, on average, how often a player will generate offense each at bat. This means that
players with a higher SLG are considered more productive players than those with lower SLG.
For this reason, one would expect a player with a high SLG to receive a high salary.

10

Sacrifice flies and hits, which are instances where a player creates an out but advances a
runner on base to the next base, are not included in the measure of at bats.
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b. On base percentage
On base percentage(OBP) represents the rate at which a player reaches base. It is
calculated by dividing walks, number of times hit by a pitch and hits by the number of plate
appearances a player has. Plate appearances is a value that represents the number of times a player
attempts to get a hit against the pitcher. With the Lehman data, this value was acquired by adding
at bats, walks, number of times hit by a pitch, sacrifice hits, and sacrifice flies. OBP is an
efficiency measure, as it indicates how often a player reaches base per attempt. As such, a higher
OBP usually indicates that a player has a greater amount of offensive ability. For this reason, one
would expect a player with a high OBP to receive a high salary.
c. At bats per year
At bats per year (AB per year) indicates the average number of at bats a player has during
an average year of his career.11 As previously mentioned, at bats is a measure of how many times
a player gets a hit or makes an unproductive out. This means that walks, intentional walks,
sacrifice hits, and sacrifice flies are not included in the calculation of at bats. AB per year is
included in the model to supplement both OBP and SLG. Recall that both OBP and SLG are
efficiency measures, representing the likelihood of success per attempt. In contrast, AB per year
indicates how long a player is able to sustain his performance offensively. For example, for
players with equal values for SLG, the player with more AB per year is likely to be more
valuable, because he sustained that level of efficiency over a greater number of attempts. Also,
players with a higher number AB per year are players that are unlikely to miss games, due to
injury or other reason, during a typical year. It is for these reasons that at bats is included in my
model on a per year basis, it indicates how often the player performs at a certain level during an

11

Per year was calculated by using a measure of seasons (full or partial) played. This means that
if a player only played in 30 games one season of his career, that is still counted as a full season.
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average season. One would expect a player with a higher number of AB per year to receive a
higher salary, because they are able to sustain their performance on a more consistent basis than a
player with less AB per year.
d. Middle infield binary variable
The middle infield dummy variable indicates the position that a player primarily plays. If a player
primarily plays catcher, second base, or shortstop, this variable is equal to 1. If a player primarily
players a different position, it is equal to 0. Since salaries vary highly by position, and position is
not indicative of a player’s ability, this variable’s effect on salary is unknown. Of note, corner
infield variable was dropped from the model’s specification because it was not significant in any
regression results.
e. Total seasons
This variable is a measure of the number of seasons a player has played. This is an integer value,
so all partial seasons that a player plays are counted as 1. Since the data are segmented by
bargaining power, the hypothesized effect on salary will differ. For free agents, this variable will
likely have a negative effect on salary, because all players in that group have a minimum of six
years of experience and will likely receive lower salaries as they age. For arbitration eligible
players, this variable will likely have a positive effect on salary as those players are in the earlier
stages of their career, all having less than six years of experience.
2. Defensive variables in the model
a. Fielding Percentage
Fielding percentage equals the number of putouts and assists a player completes divided by
putouts plus assists and errors. Putouts are defined as, “a statistic credited to a fielder whose
action causes the out of a batter-runner or runner” (MLB Official Rulebook). Assists are, “a
statistic credited to a fielder whose action contributes to a batter-runner or runner being put out”
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(MLB Official Rule Book). Errors are, “a statistic charged against a fielder whose action has
assisted the team on offense” (MLB Official Rulebook). Fielding percentage is an efficiency
measure, with a higher value indicating that a player is a better fielder than one with a lower
number. For this reason, one would expect fielding percentage to have a positive effect on salary.
b. Defensive runs above average
Defensive runs above average (DEF) measures a player’s defensive value relative to the league
average. It represents the number of runs a player saves with his defensive ability compared to the
defensive ability of an average player. This statistic includes a positional adjustment, which
means that components of its calculation are weighted differently based upon the position the
player plays. This statistic is available beginning in the 2003 season, and its calculation is based
upon play-by-play data. Due to the fact that DEF is not an efficiency measure, but rather a value
that can be aggregated from year-to-yea, it appears in my model as a per year figure. This means
that its value indicates the number of runs a player saves per year. This variable was calculated by
dividing career DEF by an adjusted experience statistic, because statistics are only available back
to the 2003 season. DEF is an indicator of defensive ability, which means that players with higher
DEF statistics are better fielders than players with lower ones. For this reason, one would expect
DEF to have a positive effect on salary.
c. Defensive runs saved
Defensive runs saved (DRS) is a measure of runs saved with defensive ability compared to a
player of average ability. This statistic does not include a positional adjustment. This means that
more difficult positions, such as shortstop, are more likely to have more defensive runs saved than
an easier position, such as first base. It is an aggregation of the following: rSB (stolen bases runs
saved), rBU (bunts run saved), rGDP (double play runs saved), rARM (outfield arm runs saved),
rHR (robbed home runs runs saved), and rPM (plus minus runs saved). Each of these measures is
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calculated based on play by play data and compared to a player of average ability. DRS is
included on a per year basis because it is not an efficiency measure, thus it can be aggregated
from year to year, so players who have play longer will have higher DRS values than those that
have not played as long. This variable was calculated by dividing career DRS by an adjusted
experience statistic, because statistics are only available back to the 2003 season. DRS is an
indicator of defensive ability, which means that players who are better at defense have higher
DRS statistics than players that are not as skilled defensively. For this reason, one would expect
DRS to have a positive effect on salary.
d. Errors per year
Errors per year is calculated by dividing the total number of errors committed by number of
seasons played. Errors represent the number of times a player makes a mistake on defense, this
means that players with a higher number of errors, in theory, possess less defensive ability than
players that commit less errors. That being said, players with more defensive chances, such as
infielders, also likely commit more errors due to higher volume. However, all else fixed, one
would expect errors per year to have a negative effect on salary. This means that players with
more errors per year would be expected to have a lower salary than players with less errors per
year, all else fixed. This variable is included on a per year basis because it can be aggregated from
season to season. As such, including a variable for total errors committed in a player’s career
would not be a fair measure of a player’s defensive ability, as the longer a player plays, the more
likely he is to commit errors. Instead, the including errors on a per season basis allows me to
cancel out the effects of player experience in the variable.
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e. Defensive wins above replacement
Defensive wins above replacement (DWAR) is a calculation of wins generated from a player’s
defensive ability compared to a player of average ability. This statistic includes a positional
adjustment, which means that the weights of its components are adjusted based on which position
a player typically plays. It is calculated by dividing the number of runs saved by a player’s
defensive ability compared to an average player by the number of runs saved necessary to account
for a win. Due to the fact that it is not an efficiency measure, DWAR is included in the model on
a per year basis. DWAR can be aggregated from year to year, so players with more time in the
league have higher career DWAR values than players with less time. To eliminate this bias, it was
calculated on a per year basis by dividing career DWAR by total seasons played. DWAR is
available back to 1934, so an adjusted experience statistic was not used to adjust it on a per season
basis. This statistic is an indicator of defensive ability, which means that players with greater
defensive ability have a higher DWAR statistic. For this reason, one would expect DWAR to have
a positive effect on salary.
VI.

Free Agent Results

A. Non-released Free Agent Player Results
1. Description of Free Agent Sample
The summary statistics of this sample indicate that the sample is largely representative of the
demographics of the MLB. 60.4% of all players in the sample are White, while 29.6% are
Hispanic, and the remaining 10% are Black. These values are all within 5% of actual
demographic estimates of the entire MLB. In this sample, Hispanic players receive the highest
mean salaries, while White players receive the lowest mean salary among these three
demographic groups.
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2. Results
a. Equation 1.1
The results of equation 1.1 indicate that SLG, AB, SB, MIF, and Hispanic all have a statistically
significant positive effect on salary, while total seasons played has a statistically significant
negative effect. All else fixed, a 1% increase in slugging percentage would cause a 10.56%
increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance.
The results for OBP would indicate that at the 5% level of significance, OBP does not have a
statistically significant impact on salary. The results for AB indicate that, for example, an extra 10
AB per year would cause a 2.01% increase in salary, all else fixed. This result was found to be
significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year indicate that an
increase in stolen bases per year by one causes a 2.48% increase in salary. This result was found
to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of Free Agent Players
White

Hispanic

Black

Salary (millions)

Mean
(sd, max, min)
5.249
(5.316,25,0.586)

Mean
(sd, max, min)
6.692
(6.326,24,0.718)

Mean
(sd, max, min)
6.391
(6.207,25,0.700)

SLG

0.433
(0.0496,0.567,0.301)

0.419
(0.0630,0.617,0.314)

0.417
(0.0490,0.586,0.349)

OBP

0.335
(0.0276,0.427,0.250)

0.323
(0.0306,0.420,0.265)

0.329
(0.0192,0.376,0.261)

AB

360.0
(99.57,673.8,146.1)

374.4
(110.9,592.9,143.9)

437.5
(91.96,571.5,149.3)

SB

5.665
(6.519,37.67,0)

6.595
(8.013,41.11,0.143)

17.72
(14.11,46.17,1.429)

MIF

0.363
(0.482,1,0)

0.545
(0.501,1,0)

0.154
(0.368,1,0)

Total Seasons

9.510
(2.805,20,6)

10.44
(3.447,23,6)

9.538
(2.470,16,7)

Fielding Percentage

0.985
(0.00866,0.998,0.954)

0.982
(0.0112,0.995,0.940)

0.986
(0.00763,0.994,0.969)

DEF

0.496
(6.702,14.26,-12.87)

2.708
(6.633,15.82,-12.48)

-0.429
(7.277,12.26,-14.15)

DRS

0.897
(4.932,14.43,-12.25)

0.724
(4.147,12.10,-10.25)

0.578
(4.899,9.857,-11.40)

Errors

5.422
(3.560,20.14,0.636)

7.576
(4.811,19.58,1.235)

4.930
(3.207,14.10,1)

DWAR

0.0554
(0.743,2.057,-1.450)

0.250
(0.671,1.538,-1.086)

0.0121
(0.677,1.229,-1.225)

N

157

77

26
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Table 2
Free Agents Results
SLG

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

10.56***

10.60***

11.00***

11.06***

10.68***

11.12***

(1.582)

(1.583)

(1.541)

(1.558)

(1.570)

(1.547)

*

OBP

4.599
(2.757)

4.279
(2.781)

5.720
(2.693)

4.577
(2.702)

4.182
(2.742)

5.925*
(2.706)

AB

0.00201***

0.00204***

0.00214***

0.00188**

0.00260***

0.00188**

SB

(0.000600)
0.0248***

(0.000601)
0.0252***

(0.000584)
0.0176*

(0.000589)
0.0230***

(0.000651)
0.0240***

(0.000585)
0.0190**

(0.00680)

(0.00682)

(0.00684)

(0.00668)

(0.00676)

(0.00679)

MIF

***

0.605
(0.119)

***

0.607
(0.119)

**

0.358
(0.131)

***

0.554
(0.118)

***

0.714
(0.128)

0.376**
(0.130)

Hispanic

0.357**

0.370**

0.345**

0.379***

0.401***

0.361***

(0.111)

(0.112)

(0.108)

(0.109)

(0.112)

(0.108)

-0.116***

-0.117***

-0.127***

-0.119***

-0.119***

-0.122***

(0.0169)

(0.0169)

(0.0166)

(0.0166)

(0.0168)

(0.0165)

Total
Seasons
Fielding
Percentage

4.639
(5.229)
0.0366***

DEF

(0.00916)
0.0350***

DRS

(0.0105)
-0.0319*
(0.0143)

Errors

0.330***

DWAR
Constant
Adjusted R2
N

8.892

***

4.407

8.505

***

8.764

***

8.920

***

(0.0856)
8.415***

(0.649)

(5.097)

(0.638)

(0.638)

(0.644)

(0.644)

0.465

0.464

0.495

0.485

0.473

0.492

260

260

260

260

260

260
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The results for MIF indicate that, all else fixed, middle infielders are paid 67.4% more
than players at other positions.12 This result was significant at all reasonable levels of
significance. This finding suggests that when offensive performance statistics are held constant,
teams value a middle infielder more than either a corner infielder or outfielder. This is likely
because middle infielders that possess average levels of offensive ability are at a premium in the
MLB. This is reflected within my sample, as the mean OBP and SLG for middle infielders are
7.2% and 14.8% below the mean value of OBP and SLG for all other players. For this reason, it
makes sense that given a middle infielder and non-middle infielder of equal offensive ability, a
team would pay more for the middle infielder. The results for the Hispanic variable indicate that,
all else fixed, Hispanic players are paid 52.6% more than non-Hispanic players.13 This result was
found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance. There could be a variety of reasons
behind this finding. First, this could be attributed to a level of bias, as Hispanic players receive the
highest mean salary of all race/ethnicities within the sample. Correlation coefficients do not
suggest that there is a high level of correlation between the Hispanic variable and other data
collected. The results for Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, each additional number of
seasons played causes a 11.6% drop in salary for free agent players. This result was significant at
all reasonable levels of significance. The negative coefficient estimate of this variable likely
represents the fact that all players in this sample have at least six years of MLB experience. This
means that this sample has primarily older players, and as players play more seasons, their
performance declines, resulting in a lower salary.

12

This coefficient estimate was adjusted using the method suggested by Giles (2011), as will the
coefficient estimates for all binary variables in this paper.
13
Coefficient estimates for the Black binary variable were not significant
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b. Equation 1.2
In equation 1.2, the fielding percentage variable is added to the core model. The results
from this equation indicate that career fielding percentage is not significant at the 5% level of
significance. For that reason, I would fail to reject the null hypothesis that fielding percentage has
no impact on salary. This result is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Fielding percentage is a
statistic that has been the standard for measuring a player’s defensive ability for a majority of the
history of the MLB. It is calculated using statistics that are officially collected by the MLB,
indicating the rate of efficiency that a player successfully completes a defensive play that an MLB
official scorer decides he should be able to complete. The results from this equation indicate that
this statistic, despite its historical prevalence, is not used in the salary determination process for
free agent players. It is possible that with the advent of new statistics in recent years, including
some of the statistics used in subsequent equations, both players and teams are relying on
different measures of ability. An interesting area for further research would be to examine the
significance of fielding percentage in the salary determination model over time. However, my
sample only includes observations dating back to 2012.
c. Equation 1.3
In equation 1.3, defensive runs above average per year is added to the core equation.
Recall that DEF is a measure of runs saved by defensive ability by a player compared to a player
of average ability. This value can be either positive or negative, with a value of zero indicating
average defensive ability. The results for DEF indicate that, all else fixed, an increase in DEF by
1 causes a 3.66% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels
of significance. Given the results for equation 1.2, the results for DEF suggest that players and
teams are taking advantage of defensive metrics other than fielding percentage to make their
salary determination decision. DEF is a newer statistic, created in the 2000s, and of note is its
39

inclusion of a positional adjustment. The calculation of DEF varies based on the position a player
plays. This adjustment cancels out differences in volume based on position. That is to say,
statistics such as fielding percentage assume all positions are equal. This means that there is no
adjustment for the fact that some positions, such as shortstop, receive more opportunities to make
a defensive play than other positions. The qualities that make a player excel defensively vary by
position, and DEF takes this variance into account by weighting components differently based on
position. In doing so, the DEF statistic gives an output that is comparable across positions to
signify a player’s overall defensive ability. This fact is likely the reason why it was found to be
significant in the salary determination model, whereas fielding percentage was not.
d. Equation 1.4
In equation 1.4, the DRS variable was added to the core equation. Recall that similar to
DEF, DRS is a measure of runs saved by defensive ability compared to a player of average
ability. The primary difference between the two statistics is that DRS does not include a
positional adjustment. This value can be positive or negative, with a value of zero indicating
average defensive ability. The results for DRS indicate that, all else fixed, an increase in DRS per
year by one causes a 3.5% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all
reasonable levels of significance. For that reason, I would reject the null hypothesis that DRS has
no impact on salary.
e. Equation 1.5
The results for the Errors variable indicate that, all else fixed, each additional error
committed per year causes a 3.19% decrease in salary. This result was found to be significant at
all reasonable levels of significance. For that reason, I would reject the null hypothesis that Errors
has no impact on salary. This result is in line with intuition, as errors are associated with poor
defensive ability. This result is noteworthy because errors are a component of fielding percentage
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calculation, which the results from equation 1.2 show is not statistically significant. The Errors
variable is correlated with the position a player plays, and that holds true in this sample. The
average infielder in this sample commits 7.23 errors per year, while the average outfielder
commits 3.23 errors per year. With errors serving as the measure of defensive ability, this
statistical results suggests that the average outfielder possesses more than twice the defensive
ability than the average infielder. This finding is not in line with the results of any of the other
defensive statistics in this sample. In fact, for each DEF, DRS, and DWAR, the mean value in this
sample is lower for outfielders than non-outfielders, suggesting a lower level of defensive ability.
Considering those facts, the results from equation 1.5 likely speak more to the positive correlation
between outfielders and salary and the low mean values of errors per year for outfielders relative
to the rest of the sample. This finding once again shows the flaws in officially collected MLB
defensive statistics, as errors has been a defensive statistic collected throughout the history of the
MLB.
f. Equation 1.6
In equation 1.6, the DWAR variable is added to the core equation. Recall that DWAR is
the measure of wins generated by a player’s defensive ability compared to a player of average
ability. This value can be either positive or negative, with average ability equaling a value of zero.
This statistic includes a positional adjustment, similar to DEF. The results for DWAR indicate
that, all else fixed, an increase in DWAR per year by one causes a 33.0% increase in salary. This
result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance.
g. Robustness Tests
I also conducted a series of tests to determine the robustness of the results and to
determine whether the significance of the results is due to a possible omitted variable. While not
technically a test for robustness, I will first discuss the implications of the inclusion of both the
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Black and corner infield (CIF) binary variables. Both of these variables were a part of the original
specification of the core model. However, the estimated coefficients for both variables are never
statistically significant. Furthermore, the inclusion of the Black binary variable did little to alter
the significance or the coefficient estimates of other variables in the model. The same findings
held for the CIF variable. These results indicate that both of these variables do not appear to be
relevant in the salary determination process.
The next set of tests sought to determine if the interaction of defensive statistics with the
Hispanic and MIF binary variables yielded significant results or altered the coefficient estimates
of other variables. The results of interacting the MIF variable with each defensive statistic where
inconsistent, altering the significance of some variables, leaving the significance of others
unchanged. The inclusion of the interaction variable with fielding percentage and DEF caused
MIF to lose significance at the 5% level. It also caused the Errors variable to lose significance at
the 5% level. In all cases, the interaction variable was not significant, and it did little to alter the
coefficient estimates for the remaining variables.
The results were the same when the MIF variable was disaggregated and the positions of
catcher, shortstop, and second base were included separately, each with its own interaction
variables. These results show that middle infielders do not have a statistically significant increase
in salary due to defensive ability relative to other positions. The results from interacting the
Hispanic binary variable with defensive statistics showed that the inclusion of the interaction
variable did little to alter significance levels or coefficient estimates of other variables, and in all
cases the interaction variable is not significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that Hispanic
players do not receive higher salaries for their defensive ability relative to other players.14

14

The same tests were run for the Black and CIF binary variables, yielding the same statistically
insignificant results.
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The final set of tests I conducted sought to hold external variables surrounding the player’s
contract negotiation fixed. These external variables can be sorted into two major categories: team
fixed effects and year fixed effects. In order to examine the team fixed effects, I introduced a
binary variable for 29 of the 30 MLB teams, and examined the impact the inclusion of these
variables had on the significance and coefficient estimates of other variables.15 The binary
variable is equal to one if the player signed with that team and equal to 0 if the player signed with
a different team. These team-specific binary variables work to hold constant variables such as
team payroll, market size, and team success. The inclusion of these variables did not alter the
coefficient estimates or significance of other variables in the model, suggesting that the team with
which a player signs does not have a significant effect on salary. In order to hold the effects of a
year fixed, I introduced a binary variable for the first year the contract took effect into the model,
and examined how the inclusion of these variables affected the coefficient estimates and
significance of other variables. If the player’s contract began in 2012, then the 2012 binary is
equal to one, and it began during a different season, then the 2012 binary is equal to zero. I
introduced such a binary for the 2012, 2013 and 2014 seasons.16 The inclusion of these binary
variables did not significantly alter the coefficient estimates or significance levels of other
variables in the model. The results of this robustness test shows that the year the player’s contract
began does not have a significant impact on salary.
h. Summary of Results
The results from these regressions suggest that defensive ability has a significant impact on

15

The 30th team acted as the reference group. Of the coefficient estimates of these binary
variables, only one, Philadelphia Phillies, was statistically significant. It had a negative coefficient
estimate.
16
2015 was the reference group. Of the coefficient estimates of these binary variables, the 2012
and 2013 variables were both statistically significant and negative
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player salary for free agent players. The movement of the adjustment r-squared value shows that
the defensive variables that cause the largest increase are the positionally adjusted statistics of
DWAR and DEF. DEF caused the adjusted r-squared value to increase from .465 to .495 relative
to the core equation, while DWAR caused an increase to .492. While not positionally adjusted,
DRS also caused a sizable increase in the r-squared value, while the Errors variable caused the
smallest increase of all statistically significant variables. This suggests that the Errors variable
had the least amount of explanatory power of all statistically significant variables used. This
finding furthers the hypothesis that officially collected MLB statistics such as errors and fielding
percentage are less commonly used for assessing a player’s value at least within the free agent
market.
B. Released Free Agents
1. Model
This samples includes players that were arbitration eligible, but were released by their former
team and effectively became free agents as a result. This group includes 57 players, all of which
went through a different salary determination process than players that had similar levels of
experience, as all of these players have less than six years of experience, and are only free agents
due to their release. The core equation used to examine this salary determination was the same as
the core equation used in previous sections. This equation includes SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF,
Latin American, and Total Seasons as the explanatory variables. In each subsequent regression
the defensive variables of fielding percentage, DEF, DRS, Errors, and DWAR were added
individually.
The demographics of this sample suggest that it is relatively representative of the
demographics of the entire MLB. 64.9% of the sample is White, 21.1% is Hispanic, and 14.0% is
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Table 3
Summary Statistics of Arbitration Eligible Free Agent Players
White

Hispanic

Black

Mean
(sd, max, min)
1.496

Mean
(sd, max, min)
1.310

Mean
(sd, max, min)
1.085

(1.407,6,0.503)

(0.702,2.750,0.750)

(0.405,1.850,0.505)

SLG

0.383
(0.0461,0.494,0.308)

0.346
(0.0400,0.437,0.296)

0.374
(0.0445,0.429,0.318)

OBP

0.312

0.301

0.315

AB

(0.0237,0.359,0.259)
286.9

(0.0206,0.335,0.270)
232.4

(0.0109,0.333,0.300)
264.8

(125.0,536,98.25)

(72.61,346.6,127.6)

(67.64,382.4,154.7)

4.668
(4.795,22.33,0)

5.161
(8.159,27.20,0.200)

14.42
(10.32,27.60,2.800)

Salary (millions)

SB
MIF

0.405

0.833

0

Total Seasons

(0.498,1,0)
4.730

(0.389,1,0)
5.333

(0,0,0)
4.625

(0.962,6,3)

(0.651,6,4)

(0.916,6,3)

Fielding Percentage

0.978
(0.0121,0.997,0.956)

0.984
(0.00905,0.994,0.968)

0.985
(0.00551,0.992,0.975)

DEF

-1.732

2.880

0.506

DRS

(4.636,5.500,-11.48)
-0.513

(2.784,7.333,-1.820)
1.053

(5.746,10.76,-4.900)
0.423

(4.318,7.400,-10.83)

(1.823,3.833,-2.333)

(4.392,9.400,-4)

Errors

5.698
(4.111,21.67,0.250)

4.893
(3.237,13,1.200)

2.312
(0.925,3.750,1)

DWAR

-0.160

0.343

-0.116

N

(0.586,0.900,-1.400)
37

(0.181,0.667,-0.0600)
12

(0.588,1.040,-0.720)
8
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Black. This suggests that White and Black players are slightly overrepresented in this sample,
while Hispanic players are underrepresented. White players have the highest mean salary in this
sample, while Black players have the lowest. This finding is interesting given that the none of the
demographic groups consistently has the highest average performance statistics.
2. Results
a. Equation 2.1
The results of equation 2.1 indicate that the SLG, AB, and SB variables all have a
statistically significant positive effect on arbitration eligible free agent salary. All else fixed, a
1% increase in slugging percentage would cause a 6.20% increase in team salary offer. This
result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for OBP are
marginally significant, but not significant at the 5% level. The results for AB would indicate that
an extra 10 AB per year would cause a 2.49% increase in salary, all else fixed. This result was
found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year
indicate that each additional stolen bases per year corresponds to a 2.04% increase in salary. This
result is significant at the 4.7% level of significance. The results for MIF also indicate that the
positional variable does not have a significant impact on salary. The results for the Hispanic
variable are not significant at the 5% level, indicating that ethnicity does not have a significant
effect on an arbitration eligible free agent’s salary.17 The results for the Total Seasons variable
are not significant at the 5% level of significance, indicating this variable does not have a
significant role in determining arbitration eligible free agent salary.18 The adjusted r-squared
value of this equation was .494.

17
18

The Hispanic variable was marginally statistically significant, with a p-value of .11
Total Seasons was also marginally statistically significant, with a p-value of .11 as well
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Table 4
Arbitration Eligible Free Agents
2.1
SLG

6.205

2.2
**

6.252

2.3
**

6.518

2.4
**

7.259

***

2.5
6.124

2.6
**

7.141**

(1.916)

(1.934)

(2.110)

(2.050)

(1.933)

(2.149)

OBP

-6.143
(3.984)

-6.486
(4.080)

-6.505
(4.136)

-5.940
(3.952)

-5.351
(4.212)

-6.489
(4.002)

AB

0.00249**

0.00251**

0.00258**

0.00269**

0.00218*

0.00265**

SB

(0.000808)
0.0204*

(0.000815)
0.0209*

(0.000845)
0.0200

(0.000813)
0.0200*

(0.000959)
0.0202*

(0.000824)
0.0200

(0.00997)

(0.0101)

(0.0101)

(0.00989)

(0.0100)

(0.00999)

0.0296
(0.146)

0.0441
(0.150)

0.0330
(0.148)

0.120
(0.159)

-0.00644
(0.158)

0.0358
(0.146)

MIF
Hispanic

0.256

0.232

0.246

0.236

0.274

0.234

Total Seasons

(0.157)
0.112

(0.166)
0.117

(0.161)
0.102

(0.157)
0.0955

(0.161)
0.102

(0.159)
0.0916

(0.0689)

(0.0702)

(0.0743)

(0.0694)

(0.0715)

(0.0722)

Fielding
Percentage

2.648
(5.576)

DEF

0.00584
(0.0158)

DRS

0.0245
(0.0179)

Errors

0.0124
(0.0202)

DWAR

0.136
(0.141)

Constant
Adjusted R2
N

***

12.11
(1.109)

0.494
57
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

***

***

***

9.575
(5.458)

12.14
(1.121)

11.65
(1.150)

11.98
(1.136)

11.94***
(1.124)

0.486
57

0.485
57

0.503
57

0.487
57

0.493
57
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b. Equation 2.2
The addition of the fielding percentage variable to the core equation did not yield
significant results. The results of equation 2.2 indicate that fielding percentage does not have a
statistically significant effect on the salaries of released free agents. Adding this variable to the
equation also resulted in a decrease in the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core equation
from .494 to .486. The variable also causes the coefficient estimate of the constant variable to
lose statistical significance at the 5% level. That being said, it did little to alter the coefficient
estimates of other significant variables in the equation.
c. Equation 2.3
Adding DEF to the equation also does not yield statistically significant results, indicating
that changes in the DEF variable do not have a statistically significant effect on released free
agent salary. The inclusion of this variable also causes a decrease in the adjusted r-squared value,
from .494 to .485. This variable’s inclusion causes SB to become insignificant at the 5% level.
DEF also causes an increase in the coefficient estimate of SLG, however it does not alter its
significance. That being said, the inclusion of this variable does little to alter the coefficient
estimates of the other statistically significant variables in the equation.
d. Equation 2.4
The results indicate that changes in the DRS variable does not have a statistically
significant on salaries for released free agent player. That being said, the inclusion of this
variable does cause the adjusted r-squared value to increase relative to the core equation, from
.494 to .503. Adding this variable to the equation causes a large increase in the coefficient
estimate of SLG, from 6.20 to 7.26. However, it did little to alter the coefficient estimates or
significance of the other variables.
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e. Equation 2.5
The results indicate that changes in the Errors variable does not have a statistically
significant effect on arbitration eligible free agent salaries. This variable is found to be
significant at the 54.2% level, thus, at the 5% level of significance, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis that Errors does not impact salary. The inclusion of this variable also caused the
adjusted r-squared value to decrease from .494 to .487. However, the inclusion of this variable
did little to alter the coefficient estimates of other significant variables.
f. Equation 2.6
In equation 2.6, DWAR is added to the salary determination model. The results indicate
that the inclusion of this variable does not have a statistically significant impact on salaries for
arbitration eligible free agent players. The inclusion of this variable caused SB to become
insignificant at the 5% level. DWAR also caused the coefficient estimate of SLG to increase
from 6.20 to 7.14. However, it had a negligible impact on the coefficient estimates of other
significant variables relative to the core equation.
g. Robustness Tests
I conducted a series of tests to check the robustness of my salary estimation results and
determine whether the significance of any of the variables in the model was the result of omitted
variable bias. First, I will mention that the Black and CIF variable were included in the original
specification of the model, but both variables were found to never be significant. The inclusion
of each of these variables did not alter the significance of other variables. Second, I included an
interaction variable between defensive statistics and both the Hispanic and MIF variables. The
coefficient estimates for all of the interaction variables were not found to be significant, and the
inclusion of these variables did not alter the significance of other variables.
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The final tests I conducted aimed to examine how the coefficient estimates of variables in
the core model behaved when the effects of both team and year were held constant. I introduced
a team binary variable to hold team effects constant. These binary variables represented the team
with which each player signed. The inclusion of these team binary variables caused the SB
variable to become insignificant. Beyond changing the significance of this variable, the inclusion
of team binary variables did not alter the coefficient estimates or significance of other variables
in the model. These results suggest that the team a player signs with does not significantly
impact the player’s salary. In order to hold year effects constant, I introduced a binary variable
that indicated the year each player’s contract began. The inclusion of these variables also made
the SB variable insignificant at the 5% level. However, beyond that change, these variables did
not alter the coefficient estimates of other variables. This indicates that the results from my
regression analysis, with the exception of the predicted value of the SB variable, the year each
player’s contract began did not alter the salary determination process.
h. Summary of Results
The observations in this sample poses an interesting puzzle. These players do not have
enough experience to enter the free agent market conventionally, however, they are granted free
agency after being released by their original teams. As such, their bargaining power increases as
they are able to have all 30 MLB teams compete for their services. Ceretis paribus, this change in
bargaining power should be associated with a higher salary than players with similar levels of
experience, who are limited to salary determination through the free agent process. However, the
data indicated that these released players are unable to enjoy the positive salary benefits
associated with extra bargaining power. The mean salary for an arbitration eligible free agent in
my dataset is less than half the mean salary for an arbitration eligible player who is limited to
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negotiated with his current team. This suggests that these released players were likely released
for a reason, and that reason is poor performance. The release of a player is a sign that that player
is not as skilled as a player that a team chooses not to release. For this reason, it is difficult to
find a salary determination equation for these players, as demand for their services is low. Teams
are able to acquire their services for low salaries because of low demand. As such, performance
variables do not have a large impact on salary for these arbitration eligible free agents. It is likely
for this reason that so few of the variables in my equations are significant. It is difficult to predict
the salary of low quality players.
The results from these equations show that SLG, AB and SB are significant in
determining salary. However, when DEF and DWAR are added, SB becomes insignificant at the
5% level, whereas the addition of fielding percentage, DRS and Errors did not cause this to
happen. Since both DEF and DWAR include positional adjustments, while the other three
defensive variables do not, it is likely that when significant, SB is explaining some of the
positional variance in salary. None of the defensive variables in these equations are found to be
significant. The variable that caused the largest increase in the adjusted r-squared value was
DRS, but that increase was less than .01. From a theory standpoint, these results do not line up
with intuition. In many cases, low quality players are signed by teams to specialize in a certain
area, whether it be offensively or defensively related. The mean values of the four offensive
variables in this sample are well below the mean values for offensive variables in the other two
samples I examined, while the defensive statistics are comparable. This would suggest that if an
arbitration eligible free agent player were to be signed by a team in order to specialize, it would
likely be for their defensive ability. However, the regression results to not follow this theory.
There are a variety of reasons for why the results from this sample indicate weaker
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relationships between salary and player performance. First, the sample size is small, so there
could be some bias in the sample. Second, players in this sample have received less playing time
throughout their career than players in the other samples, so offensive efficiency measures, such
as SLG and OBP, hold greater explanatory power than statistics that can be aggregated from
season to season such as DEF, DRS, Errors and DWAR. Third and lastly, these salaries are on
average close to the league minimum, thus performance metrics have little impact on general
salary determination for these players. The third explanation is the most likely. Standard
deviations for all of the variables in this sample are far smaller than in the other two samples,
indicating that most players in the sample possess similar levels of ability. This means that there
is not much to differentiate one from another in terms of ability. Therefore, salary is going to be
less dependent on player performance, and more dependent on the market price for this type of
player, which in this case is more in line with the league minimum salary, which is less than one
standard deviation away from the mean salary for players in this sample.
VII.

Arbitration Eligible Player Results

A. All Arbitration Eligible Players
1. Model
There are some key differences between this dataset and the free agent dataset. First, all of the
players in this dataset had less than six years of MLB experience beginning in 2012. For this
reason, there was no need to adjust the advanced defensive metrics with an adjusted experience
variable, as all of the players in this sample entered the league after the 2003 season. The
logarithmic transformation was once again used on average annual value of a player’s contract to
account for the average value of the player to his team when the contract was signed. The core
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Table 5
Summary Statistics of Arbitration Eligible Players
White

Hispanic

Black

Mean
(sd, max, min)
3.519

Mean
(sd, max, min)
3.444

Mean
(sd, max, min)
4.764

(3.317,24.08,0.560)

(3.364,25,0.505)

(3.868,20,0.988)

SLG

0.403
(0.0498,0.544,0.262)

0.389
(0.0545,0.540,0.308)

0.407
(0.0381,0.496,0.324)

OBP

0.322

0.318

0.330

AB

(0.0267,0.404,0.226)
318.5

(0.0219,0.364,0.266)
307.5

(0.0160,0.362,0.304)
402.5

(110.2,578.8,87.50)

(106.8,583,102.5)

(106.8,584,141)

5.625
(6.527,35,0)

7.250
(7.718,34,0)

16.60
(10.81,43.33,1)

Salary (millions)

SB
MIF

0.417

0.613

0.0556

Total Seasons

(0.494,1,0)
4.456

(0.490,1,0)
4.537

(0.232,1,0)
4.389

(0.895,6,3)

(0.993,6,3)

(1.022,6,3)

Fielding Percentage

0.983
(0.0121,0.998,0.935)

0.980
(0.0124,0.995,0.934)

0.986
(0.00654,0.997,0.964)

DEF

0.437

1.560

0.400

DRS

(6.258,16.40,-21.10)
0.618

(4.180,13.50,-9.433)
1.009

(6.635,12.43,-12.73)
2.489

(5.021,19.25,-13.67)

(4.096,15.20,-10.50)

(7.489,16.75,-8.333)

Errors

5.667
(3.902,19.60,0.400)

6.656
(4.716,22,0.600)

4.094
(2.664,15.67,1)

DWAR

0.0607

0.241

0.159

N

(0.691,2.183,-2.100)
204

(0.457,1.300,-1.033)
80

(0.864,2,-1.733)
36
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equation used to examine this salary determination was the same as the core equation used in
previous sections. This equation includes SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, Latin American, and Total
Seasons as the explanatory variables. In each subsequent regression the defensive variables of
fielding percentage, DEF, DRS, Errors, and DWAR were added individually.
A key difference from the spread of summary statistics in this sample was the simple fact
that this sample was not as representative of the demographic dispersion of the total Major
Leagues. 25% of this sample identified as Hispanic, while estimates indicate that 29.4% of the
MLB is Hispanic. 12% of this sample was of players that are Black, while 8.3% players in the
MLB identify as Black. 63.75% of the players in this sample are considered to be White, while in
2015 58.8% of players in the MLB were White. This is a slight deviation from the other sample
in terms of being representative of the MLB, but it is still within 5% for each race and ethnicity.
In most cases, White players have lower mean values for the advanced defensive metrics, with
the exception of DEF. Black players have a much larger mean value for stolen bases, which
likely led to the African-American variable being insignificant in all regression results. In this
sample, Black players have the highest mean salary, while Latin American players have the
lowest. The average experience level for all of the players is comparable across race and
ethnicity, with the largest difference in means being less than .2 seasons. This indicates that the
spread of player experience in the sample is likely uniform across race and ethnicity.
2. Results
a. Equation 3.1
The results of Equation 3.1 indicate that SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, and Total Seasons all
have a statistically significant positive effect on salary. All else fixed, a 1% increase in slugging
percentage would cause a 6.37% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all
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Table 6
Arbitration Eligible Results
3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

6.367***
(0.561)
2.348*
(1.017)
0.00372***
(0.000219)
0.00788**
(0.00292)

6.389***
(0.562)
2.255*
(1.029)
0.00374***
(0.000224)
0.00787**
(0.00292)

6.690***
(0.554)
2.406*
(0.995)
0.00380***
(0.000216)
0.00500
(0.00295)

6.408***
(0.566)
2.338*
(1.018)
0.00372***
(0.000220)
0.00770**
(0.00294)

6.349***
(0.561)
2.486*
(1.026)
0.00358***
(0.000259)
0.00809**
(0.00293)

6.658***
(0.563)
2.328*
(1.005)
0.00369***
(0.000217)
0.00639*
(0.00293)

MIF

0.163***

0.164***

0.118*

0.166***

0.144**

0.127**

Hispanic

(0.0465)
0.0373

(0.0465)
0.0418

(0.0469)
0.0397

(0.0468)
0.0370

(0.0501)
0.0315

(0.0475)
0.0345

(0.0464)

(0.0469)

(0.0454)

(0.0464)

(0.0467)

(0.0458)

0.278***
(0.0214)

0.277***
(0.0215)

0.271***
(0.0210)

0.278***
(0.0214)

0.281***
(0.0215)

0.275***
(0.0212)

SLG
OBP
AB
SB

Total Seasons
Fielding
Percentage

1.110
(1.730)
0.0146***

DEF

(0.00372)

DRS

0.00217
(0.00391)

Errors

0.00610
(0.00606)
0.0942**

DWAR
Constant
Adjusted R2
N

8.894***

7.819***

8.779***

8.881***

8.863***

(0.0325)
8.821***

(0.285)

(1.699)

(0.280)

(0.287)

(0.287)

(0.283)

0.808

0.808

0.816

0.808

0.808

0.812

320

320

320

320

320

320
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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reasonable levels of significance. The results for OBP would indicate that a 1% increase in OBP
would cause a 2.35% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at the 2.2% level
of significance. The results for AB indicate that each additional 10 AB per year would cause a
3.72% increase in salary, all else fixed. This result was found to be significant at all reasonable
levels of significance. The results for SB per year indicate that each additional stolen base per
year causes a 0.79% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at the 1% level of
significance. The results for MIF indicate that, all else fixed, middle infielders are paid 43.3%
more than players at other positions.19 This result was significant at all reasonable levels of
significance. The results for the Hispanic variable indicate that being of Hispanic ethnicity has
no significant impact on salary. The results for Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, an
additional season played causes a 27.8% increase in salary for arbitration eligible players. This
result was significant at all reasonable levels of significance. This result is of the opposite sign as
the results from the free agent sample. This is likely because players in this dataset have played
less seasons than players in the free agent dataset, indicating that they are in earlier stages of
their career. As such, their performance is not expected to be in decline.
As noted above, the drop in significance for the Hispanic variable was likely a result of the
composition of the sample, as the mean salary for Hispanic players was the lowest among race
and ethnicity groups, despite being comparable to the mean salary for White players. However,
in the free agent sample, where the Hispanic variable is positive and significant, Hispanic players
have the highest mean salary.

19

Adjusted following the method put forth by Giles (2011)
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b. Equation 3.2
In equation 3.2, the fielding percentage variable is added to the core equation. The results
show that the fielding percentage variable is not significant at the 5% level of significance and as
such does not have a statistically significant effect on arbitration eligible player salaries. The
addition of fielding percentage to the core model did not alter largely alter any of the coefficients
of significant variables.
c. Equation 3.3
The addition of the DEF variable caused some movements of the coefficients of
significant variables from the core model. Most notably, including DEF caused stolen bases to
become insignificant at the 5% level. The inclusion of this variable also caused a -27.6% change
in the coefficient estimate for the MIF variable. However, this estimate is still within the 95%
confidence interval of the estimate from the core equation. The results show that the DEF
variable is significant at any reasonable level of significance, and indicating that, all else fixed,
an increase in DEF by one would cause a 1.46% increase in player salary.
d. Equation 3.4
Adding DRS to the core model caused little movement in the coefficients of significant
variables from the core equation. The stolen bases per year variable is once again significant at
the 5% level. However, the results for DRS show that the variable was not significant at the 5%
level of significance, indicating that changes in the DRS variable have no statistically significant
effect on arbitration eligible player salaries.
e. Equation 3.5
The inclusion of the Errors variable did not prove to be a significant addition to the core
model. The results show that the Errors variable is not significant at the 5% level, indicating that
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changes in errors per year does not have a statistically significant effect on salary. That being
said, the inclusion of the Errors variable did not considerably alter the significance levels or
coefficient estimates of any of the variables from the core model.
f. Equation 3.6
In equation 3.6, I included the defensive wins above replacement variable. Its inclusion
increased the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core model from .808 to .813. DWAR was
also found to be significant at the 0.4% level of significance, indicating that an increase in
defensive wins above replacement per year by 1 is associated with a 9.42% increase in salary.
Therefore, at the 5% level of significance, I would reject the null hypothesis that DWAR has no
effect on salary. The inclusion of DWAR did not significantly alter any of the coefficient
estimates of other variables relative to the core equation, nor did it alter the level of significance
of other variables.
g. Summary of Results
The results of the arbitration eligible equations showed indicate that both the DEF and
DWAR variable are significant at the 5% level. Both of these defensive variables are positionally
adjusted, while the defensive variables that were not statistically significant were not significant
at the 5% level in any of these equations. It is important to note that these results were for the
entire arbitration eligible dataset. The salaries of players in this dataset were determined by a
number of different processes, including: player and team negotiations prior to arbitration and
the arbitration process. For players that signed contracts with their team prior to filing for
arbitration, the process of negotiation between the team and the player was far shorter than for
players that filed for arbitration. For this reason, in the following four sets of models, I segment
the arbitration eligible dataset by salary determination process. Players that are arbitration
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eligible either avoid arbitration, file for arbitration and settle their salary prior to the arbitration
hearing, or they file for arbitration and have their salary determined by an arbitration panel. Each
outcome represents a different process, and while be explored in subsequent sections.
B. Arbitration Eligible Players, Players Who Avoided Arbitration
1. Model
As mentioned, arbitration eligible players have a variety of options for the manner in
which their salaries can be determined. Players can choose to file for arbitration, or they can
choose to re-sign with their previous team after negotiating a tender value or a new multi-year
contracts.20 Of the 320 players in the arbitration eligible dataset, 235 of them choose to not file
for arbitration. Thus, their salaries were the product of informal negotiations with their team.
From these negotiations, a value was settled upon before the arbitration file date, indicating a
different salary determination process than the other 85 players in the dataset. The core model to
examine salary determination for these players was the same as the one used for free agent
players and all arbitration eligible players in previous section. This model included the variables
SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, Hispanic, and Total Seasons.
The summary statistics indicate that this sub-sample is fairly representative of the
demographics of the Major Leagues. 63.4% of the players in this sample are White, 25.5% are
Hispanic, and 11.1% are Black. Each is within 5% of the actual values of players within the
Major Leagues. Black players have the highest mean salary in this sub-sample, and they also
have the highest mean value for most performance statistics. Mean salary values are once again
comparable for White and Hispanic players.

20

Player tenders are associated with single year contracts
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Table 7
Summary Statistics of Arbitration Eligible Players
Who Avoided Arbitration
White

Hispanic

Black

Mean
(sd, max, min)
3.180

Mean
(sd, max, min)
3.307

Mean
(sd, max, min)
4.786

(3.372 24.08 0.560)

(3.610 25 0.505)

(4.269 20 0.988)

SLG

0.396
(0.0511 0.544 0.262)

0.386
(0.0540 0.540 0.308)

0.410
(0.0375 0.496 0.324)

OBP

0.319

0.317

0.328

AB

(0.0276 0.404 0.226)
300.6

(0.0230 0.364 0.266)
297.9

(0.0148 0.352 0.304)
407.2

(110.6 578.8 87.50)

(105.3 583 102.5)

(107.8 584 141)

5.652
(6.723 35 0)

6.865
(7.658 29.50 0)

16.94
(11.66 43.33 1)

Salary (millions)

SB
MIF

0.450

0.600

0.0769

Total Seasons

(0.499 1 0)
4.483

(0.494 1 0)
4.517

(0.272 1 0)
4.423

(0.875 6 3)

(1.033 6 3)

(1.102 6 3)

Fielding Percentage

0.984
(0.0116 0.998 0.935)

0.981
(0.0121 0.995 0.935)

0.986
(0.00707 0.997 0.964)

DEF

0.875

1.510

0.0614

DRS

(5.659 16.40 -18.30)
0.666

(4.307 9.980 -9.433)
0.853

(6.404 12.43 -12.73)
2.315

(4.889 15.83 -13.33)

(3.816 12.50 -10.50)

(7.318 16.67 -8.333)

Errors

5.181
(3.775 19.60 0.400)

6.396
(4.426 21.25 1)

4.224
(3.013 15.67 1)

DWAR

0.0931

0.221

0.0893

N

(0.654 2.183 -1.460)
149

(0.443 1.125 -1.033)
60

(0.896 2 -1.733)
26
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2. Results
a. Equation 4.1
The results of Model 1 indicate that SLG, AB, SB, MIF, and Total Seasons all have a
positive effect on salary. All else fixed, a 1% increase in slugging percentage would cause a
6.74% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of
significance. The results for OBP were not significant at the 5% level, therefore, I would fail to
reject the null hypothesis that OBP has no effect on salary. The results for AB would indicate
that an extra ten AB per year would cause a 3.72% increase in salary, all else fixed. This result
was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year
indicate that a stolen base during an average causes a 0.94% increase in salary. This result was
found to be significant at the 1% level of significance, making SB statistically significant at the
5% level. The results for MIF indicate that, all else fixed, middle infielders are paid 44.9% more
than players at other positions.21 This result was significant at all reasonable levels of
significance. The results for the Hispanic variable were not found to be significant, indicating
that being of Hispanic ethnicity has no significant impact on salary for players that avoided
arbitration. The results for Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, an extra year of experience
causes a 27.2% increase in salary for arbitration eligible players. This result was significant at all
reasonable levels of significance.

21

This value was adjusted using the Giles (2011) method.
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Table 8
Arbitration Eligible Players Who Avoided Arbitration
4.1
SLG

6.742

***

4.2
6.793

***

4.3
7.269

***

4.4
6.772

***

4.5
6.711

4.6

***

7.119***

(0.668)

(0.672)

(0.658)

(0.681)

(0.670)

(0.677)

OBP

1.335
(1.191)

1.171
(1.209)

1.201
(1.151)

1.321
(1.194)

1.478
(1.205)

1.266
(1.177)

AB

0.00372***

0.00377***

0.00384***

0.00372***

0.00359***

0.00370***

SB

(0.000267)
0.00943**

(0.000274)
0.00951**

(0.000260)
0.00625

(0.000268)
0.00938**

(0.000317)
0.00958**

(0.000264)
0.00820*

(0.00345)

(0.00346)

(0.00342)

(0.00347)

(0.00346)

(0.00345)

0.199***
(0.0563)

0.204***
(0.0567)

0.142*
(0.0561)

0.201***
(0.0571)

0.179**
(0.0620)

0.166**
(0.0571)

MIF
Hispanic

0.0666

0.0724

0.0703

0.0666

0.0601

0.0637

Total Seasons

(0.0551)
0.272***

(0.0556)
0.269***

(0.0532)
0.261***

(0.0552)
0.271***

(0.0557)
0.274***

(0.0544)
0.267***

(0.0256)

(0.0258)

(0.0249)

(0.0258)

(0.0258)

(0.0254)

Fielding Percentage

1.748
(2.204)
0.0200***

DEF

(0.00483)

DRS

0.00121
(0.00495)

Errors

0.00607
(0.00775)
0.104*
(0.0407)

DWAR
Constant
Adjusted R2
N

9.037***

7.342***

8.913***

9.030***

9.010***

8.950***

(0.336)

(2.163)

(0.326)

(0.338)

(0.338)

(0.334)

0.802
235

0.801
235

0.815
235

0.801
235

0.801
235

0.806
235

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The core model for this set of players found that both the Hispanic and OBP variables are
not even marginally significant. This evidence supports the idea that the variables affecting
salary determination for players differ based on the process by which the salary is determined.
b. Equation 4.2
In this equation, the fielding percentage variable is added to the salary determination
equation. The results indicate that the fielding percentage variable is not statistically significant
at the 5% level.22 Therefore, I would fail to reject the null hypothesis that fielding percentage has
no effect on player salary. That being said, despite it being an irrelevant variable, the inclusion of
fielding percentage did not significantly alter the coefficient estimates of significant variables
compared to the core model.
c. Equation 4.3
In this equation, the DEF variable is added to the salary determination equation. The
results indicate that the DEF variable has a statistically significant positive effect on player
salary. Recall that DEF is a measure of runs saved by defensive ability compared to a player of
average ability. This statistic includes a positional adjustment, and its values in this sample range
from positive to negative, with a value of zero indicating average defensive ability. The DEF
variable is significant at all level of significance, indicating that an increase of DEF by one
corresponds to a 2.00% increase in player salary. Therefore, I would reject the null hypothesis at
the 5% level of significance that DEF has no impact on player salary. As expected, the inclusion
of a relevant defensive variable decreased the magnitude of impact of the MIF variable. This
DEF variable also made the previously statistically significant SB variable insignificant at 5%
level. DEF did not significantly alter the coefficient estimates or the significance of any of the

22

It was significant at the 42.8% level
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other variables from the core model. These results indicate that DEF is a relevant variable in
salary determination for arbitration eligible players that did not file for arbitration.
d. Equation 4.4
Adding DRS to the model caused a decline in the adjusted r-squared model relative to the
core from, and the results indicate that the variable is not statistically significant. DRS does not
appear to be a relevant variable in this salary determination equation. That being said, the
inclusion of DRS did not alter the coefficient estimates or the significance of variables from the
core model.
e. Equation 4.5
The errors variable was not found to be significant in this model at the 5% level. This is
further evidenced by the fact that the inclusion of the errors variable in the model decreased the
adjusted r-square value relative to the core model, suggesting that this variable does not appear to
be relevant in this salary determination equation.
f. Equation 4.6
The inclusion of the DWAR variable was found to have a significant impact on the
arbitration eligible salary determination model for players that avoided arbitration. This is shown
by the fact that the adjusted r-squared value increased relative to the core model, while only
slightly, this result is of note given that three of the other four defensive variables had a negative
impact on the adjusted r-squared value. On top of that, DWAR was found to be significant at the
1.1% level of significance. Recall that DWAR is a measure of wins produced by a player’s
defensive ability compared to a player of average defensive ability. This statistic includes a
positional adjustment. The results indicate that an increase in DWAR by one corresponds with a
10.4% increase in salary. From these two findings, I would conclude that DWAR is a relevant
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variable in the salary determination model for arbitration eligible players that avoided arbitration.
g. Summary of Results
The results of the salary determination equation of arbitration eligible players who did
not file for arbitration indicate that the SLG, AB, SB and MIF variables have a positive
statistically significant impact on salary. These findings held true across all the results of all six
regressions run for this sample, which the exception of one equation for the SB variable. When
the DEF variable is added to the core equation, the SB variable becomes insignificant at the 5%
level. In terms of defensive statistics, the trend continues, with the results for DEF and DWAR
indicating that both variables have a positive statistically significant on player salary for
arbitration eligible players who did not file for arbitration. The other three defensive statistics
examined did not yield significant results.
C. Arbitration Eligible Players- Players Who Filed for Arbitration
1. Model
As mentioned above, the arbitration eligible dataset can be further segmented between
players that filed for arbitration and those that did not. There are 85 players in the dataset that
filed for arbitration. This set of equations will examine their final salaries, the salaries that were
agreed upon between the team and the player following the arbitration process, or, in the case of
nine players in the sample, the salary chosen by the arbitration panel. The core equation used to
examine salary determination was the same as the core equation used in previous sections. This
equation includes SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, Latin American, and Total Seasons as the
explanatory variables in the core model. In each subsequent regression the defensive variables of
fielding percentage, DEF, DRS, Errors, and DWAR are added.
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Table 9
Summary Statistics of Arbitration Eligible Players
Who Filed for Arbitration
White

Hispanic

Black

Mean
(sd, max, min)
4.437

Mean
(sd, max, min)
3.854

Mean
(sd, max, min)
4.706

(3.004,16.88,1.075)

(2.521,10,0.900)

(2.751,9.500,1.225)

SLG

0.420
(0.0415,0.514,0.310)

0.398
(0.0564,0.504,0.324)

0.399
(0.0405,0.443,0.330)

OBP

0.330

0.322

0.335

AB

(0.0225,0.381,0.280)
367.0

(0.0183,0.356,0.286)
336.2

(0.0187,0.362,0.316)
390.4

(93.84,571.2,180.2)

(108.8,551.7,144)

(108.8,492,192)

5.552
(6.022,33.75,0)

8.406
(7.982,34,0.333)

15.71
(8.700,32,6.500)

Salary (millions)

SB
MIF

0.327

0.650

0

Total Seasons

(0.474,1,0)
4.382

(0.489,1,0)
4.600

(0,0,0)
4.300

(0.952,6,3)

(0.883,6,3)

(0.823,6,3)

Fielding Percentage

0.981
(0.0134,0.996,0.948)

0.977
(0.0128,0.994,0.934)

0.986
(0.00520,0.994,0.979)

DEF

-0.751

1.710

1.281

DRS

(7.583,16.20,-21.10)
0.487

(3.875,13.50,-4.340)
1.476

(7.489,11.68,-8.700)
2.942

(5.408,19.25,-13.67)

(4.924,15.20,-5.600)

(8.309,16.75,-7.333)

Errors

6.983
(3.972,18,1.800)

7.438
(5.547,22,0.600)

3.757
(1.487,5.600,1.750)

DWAR

-0.0271

0.300

0.341

N

(0.781,1.825,-2.100)
55

(0.504,1.300,-0.440)
20

(0.788,1.900,-0.550)
10
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The summary statistics of this sample indicate that the sample was roughly representative
of the demographic spread of players in the MLB. 64.7% of players in the sample were identified
to be White, while 23.5% are Hispanic, and 11.7% is Black. Hispanic players are slightly
underrepresented in this sample relative to the demographics of the MLB. In turn, White and
Black players are slightly overrepresented relative to the same standard. Black players in this
sample have the highest average salary, while also having the best performance statistics on
average for a majority of the categories in Table 7.
2. Results
a. Equation 5.1
The results of equation 5.1 indicate that SLG, OBP, AB, and Total Seasons all have a
statistically significant positive effect on salary. All else fixed, a 1% increase in slugging
percentage would cause a 5.13% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all
reasonable levels of significance. The results for OBP would indicate that a 1% increase in OBP
would cause a 4.75% increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at the 4.6% level
of significance. For this reason, I would reject the null hypothesis that OBP has no effect on
salary at the 5% level of significance. The results for AB would indicate that each additional 10
AB per year would cause a 3.37% increase in salary, all else fixed. This result was found to be
significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year indicate this
variable does not have a statistically significant impact on salary determination for the agreed
upon salary of players that file for arbitration. The results for MIF indicate that the positional
variable does not have a significant impact on player salary. The results for the Hispanic variable
indicate that this variable does not have a statistically significant effect on salary. The results for
Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, each additional year of experience causes a 30.3%
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Table 10
Arbitration Eligible Players Who Filed for Arbitration
5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

SLG

5.132***

5.085***

5.158***

5.083***

5.137***

5.212***

OBP

(1.025)
4.752*

(1.030)
4.634*

(1.018)
5.134*

(1.022)
4.902*

(1.032)
4.784*

(1.012)
4.921*

(1.976)

(1.990)

(1.981)

(1.973)

(2.004)

(1.951)

AB

0.00337
(0.000379)

0.00339
(0.000382)

0.00341
(0.000378)

0.00335
(0.000378)

0.00334
(0.000435)

0.00334***
(0.000374)

SB

0.00454
(0.00559)

0.00408
(0.00565)

0.00181
(0.00588)

0.00269
(0.00578)

0.00460
(0.00565)

0.00167
(0.00575)

MIF

0.0843

0.0778

0.0549

0.0862

0.0815

0.0353

Hispanic

(0.0783)
-0.0409

(0.0791)
-0.0291

(0.0805)
-0.0370

(0.0781)
-0.0449

(0.0818)
-0.0417

(0.0820)
-0.0411

(0.0845)

(0.0865)

(0.0840)

(0.0843)

(0.0853)

(0.0833)

0.303***

0.302***

0.299***

0.306***

0.303***

0.302***

(0.0384)

(0.0385)

(0.0382)

(0.0384)

(0.0387)

(0.0379)

Total
Seasons

***

Fielding
Percentage

***

***

***

***

1.870
(2.691)

DEF

0.00773
(0.00542)

DRS

0.00747
(0.00614)

Errors

0.00118
(0.00916)

DWAR

0.0901
(0.0508)

Constant
Adjusted R2
N

***

8.773
(0.554)

0.804
85
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

**

***

***

***

6.994
(2.620)

8.670
(0.555)

8.740
(0.553)

8.761
(0.565)

8.727***
(0.547)

0.803
85

0.807
85

0.805
85

0.801
85

0.809
85
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increase in salary for arbitration eligible players. This result was significant at all reasonable
levels of significance, as such I conclude that this variable is a significant determinant of salary.
b. Equation 5.2
The addition of the fielding percentage variable in equation 5.2 found that fielding
percentage was not statistically significant when added to the regression equation. The adjusted
r-squared decreased relative to the core model with the addition of this variable. Based on these
results, I conclude that fielding percentage is not a significant determinant of salary for
arbitration eligible players that file for arbitration. That being said, the inclusion of this variable
did not alter the coefficient estimates of other significant variables in the model.
c. Equation 5.3
When added to the salary determination model, DEF was not found to be significant at
the 5% level.23 However, the inclusion of the DEF variable did cause the adjusted r-squared
value to increase relative to the core equation. The inclusion of the DEF variable also caused the
coefficient estimate of OBP to increase relative to the core equation estimate. This suggests that
when defensive ability is controlled for with the DEF variable, the effects of the OBP variable
increase. There was no large change in the coefficient estimations of other variables in the
equation with the addition of the DEF variable. However, the fact that DEF is not significant
indicates that it does not appear to be relevant explanatory variable in the equation for
determining the settled salary of players that filed for arbitration.
d. Equation 5.4
The DRS variable was not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. That being
said, its inclusion did increase the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core equation from

23

Found to be significant at the 15.7% level
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.804 to .805. The inclusion of DRS increases in the coefficient estimate of OBP relative to the
core model, however, this increase is not as large as the increase seen when DEF is included, as
seen in equation 5.3. DRS did not cause a large change in the coefficient estimates of any other
significant variables. Based on these results, I conclude that DRS is not a significant determinant
of the settled salary for players that file for arbitration.
e. Equation 5.5
The errors variable is not significant at the 5% level when added to the core equation.
This indicates that it does not appear to be a relevant variable for the salary determination of
arbitration eligible players that file for arbitration. This is further evidenced by the fact that the
adjusted r-squared value decreased relative to the core equation with the inclusion of the errors
variable. That being said, the inclusion of the errors variable in the model did not cause a large
change in any of the coefficient estimates of significant variables relative to the base model.
f. Equation 5.6
The inclusion of the DWAR variable did not yield significant results. DWAR was not
found to be significant at the 5% level of significance. That being said, it was marginally
significant, being found significant at the 8.0% level of significance. Also, it’s inclusion did
cause an increase in the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core model. DWAR causes the
coefficient estimates for OBP to increase relative to the core equation estimates. The DWAR
variable did not cause a large change in any of the other coefficient estimates for significant
variables.
g. Summary of Results
The fact that none of the defensive variables in these equations were found to be
statistically significant would appear to suggest that defensive ability is not factored into the

70

salary decision for arbitration eligible players. However, this conclusion is misleading at face
value, and other factors need to be considered. It would be incorrect to definitively conclude that
defensive ability is not considered when determining the salary of players that file for arbitration.
This is because the process of salary determination for players that file for arbitration and
negotiate a final salary prior to their arbitration hearing represents a departure from what I will
call “conventional formulaic salary determination.”24
For many players in the sample, the settled salary amount was the result of a process of
negotiation within a given range. The arbitration process dictates that a player and his team put
forth a value for the player’s services in the following year. The next step in the process is a
hearing, where a panel choose one of the values as the player’s salary. Of the 85 players in this
sample, all of them filed for arbitration, which means that the player and the team put forward
values for the player’s services. However, it is not that case that one of those values was the
player’s eventual salary for the next season. Only, nine of the players in this sample had their
salaries decided by an arbitration panel. This means that for those nine players, either the team
value or the player value was chosen for the player’s salary. Throughout this sample, there were

24

Conventional formulaic salary determination occurs when the salaries are determined by a
process of negotiation, where each party, the player and the team, is acting with limited
knowledge of the valuation made by the other party. An example of this would be the process of
free agency, where the anchor for negotiations is set by the team, which makes an offer to the
players from which subsequent negotiations are based. The process of determination for players
that do not file for arbitration follows the same process, with the exception that players have the
ability to negotiate with all 32 teams in free agency, compared to only their original team when
they are arbitration eligible. Salary negotiation after arbitration is not considered to fall under
this category because two anchors are set, one by the team and an additional anchor by the
player. While it is likely that other negotiations follow this process with counteroffers being
made by the player. Arbitration filings have the added element that if the valuation made by one
party is considered more suitable than the valuation made by the other, then the player will
receive a salary equal to the valuation that an arbitration panel considers more suitable. In
conventional formulaic salary determination there is no such penalty for an incorrect valuation,
thus each party has less of an incentive to depart from their respective valuations.
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76 players who filed for arbitration, but had their salaries determined through negotiations with
their original team, as they signed a deal before the arbitration hearing. These salaries followed a
very different pattern of determination.
There are 76 observations in this dataset that had salary determined by a process of
negotiation following the arbitration filing. The final negotiated salary value, which acted as the
dependent variable in these regressions, followed a three-step process of determination. Each
step likely considered each of the variables in the model differently. This suggests that the final
salary for these 76 observations were the result of three different salary determination methods.
These methods are how a player determines his own value, how a team determines a player’s
value, and the method for determining the final negotiated value. This model examined the third
process, and shows the factors that are considered for determining the negotiated value between
the range of the initial team offer and player offer. 18 of the 76 players in the sample negotiated a
salary that was equal to the midpoint between the player and team value. 36 of these 76 players
received salaries above the midpoint value, and the remaining 31 received salaries below the
midpoint. This spread of results for negotiated salaries after arbitration filings suggests that in all
cases negotiations were within the range between the player offer and team offer from the
arbitration filing. The result is not random, but in these cases the final negotiated amount is likely
a departure from how players and teams make their initial salary determination. The factors that
influence the outcome of these negotiations are shown in the results of the equations in this
section. These factors are the basis for both parties, the player and team, to examine the
likelihood that they will win in the arbitration hearing, and based on this evaluation how they
should adjust their initial valuations. If the player is considered likely to win, he will receive a
salary that is above the midpoint of the values from the filing. In contrast, if the team is likely to
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win, then the player will accept a salary that is below the midpoint. In all cases for these 76
observations the negotiated salary is equal to neither the team offer or the player offer. This
finding suggests that players and teams are willing to depart from their initial evaluations based
on the consideration of different factors.
With that being said, the conclusions from these results must be compounded in a
different light. The results of these regressions suggest that the negotiate salaries are determined
by the significant variables of SLG, OBP, AB, and total seasons. These variables represent the
factors given consideration to depart from initial valuations by each party. They also represent
factors that both the team and player consider to be key in determining the likelihood of success
against an arbitration panel. These results suggest that defensive ability is not a significant factor
of consideration during this negotiation process. However, as I previously stated, that does not
indicate that defensive ability is not a significant determinant of player salary for arbitration
eligible players. In order to make that determination, the anchor values for negotiation, the player
offer and team offer, must be examined. This is done in section 5e and 5f of this paper.
D. Arbitration Eligible Players- Player Offer
1. Model
As mentioned above, the arbitration eligible dataset can be further segmented between
players that filed for arbitration and those that did not. There were 85 players in the dataset that
did not file for arbitration. This set of equations will examine player offers, the values put forth
by the player at the exchange date prior to arbitration hearings. This means that the dependent
variable does not represent a salary earned by the player, but rather a player’s self-evaluation of
his worth. The core equation used to examine this salary determination was the same as the core
equation used in previous sections. This equation includes SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, Latin
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American, and Total Seasons as the explanatory variables in the core model. In each subsequent

Table 11
Summary Statistics of Arbitration Eligible Players Who Filed for
Arbitration Salary Amounts

Settled Salary
(millions)
Player Offer
(millions)
Team Offer
(millions)
N

White

Hispanic

Black

Mean
(sd, max, min)

Mean
(sd, max, min)

Mean
(sd, max, min)

4.437

3.854

4.706

(3.004,16.88,1.075)

(2.521,10,0.900)

(2.751,9.500,1.225)

4.672

3.837

4.698

(2.597,11.80,1.425)

(2.126,7.500,1)

(2.813,10.80,1.600)

3.371

3.051

3.512

(2.105,9,0.900)
55

(1.849,6.650,0.750)
20

(2.381,8.500,0.900)
10

regression the defensive variables of fielding percentage, DEF, DRS, Errors, and DWAR were
added.
Table 9 includes only the summary statistics for the salary figures of players who filed
for arbitration. This table includes the mean values of settled salary, which is the salary the
player received as a result of the arbitration process, player salary offers, and team salary offers.
The table does not include a summary of player performance statistics. The reason for the is
because the summary statistics for the rest of the variables in the model are the same as the
statistics in Table 7. This is because the observations in this sample are the same as the sample
used in the previous section. The lone difference is that in this section the dependent variable
will be the player’s salary offer from the arbitration process. The trends of this variable indicate
that on average, Black players put forth the highest self-evaluated value, while Hispanic players
put forth the lowest.
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Table 12
Arbitration Eligible Players Player Salary Offer
SLG

6.1

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.5

6.6

4.525***

4.503***

4.560***

4.465***

4.537***

4.621***

(0.767)

(0.772)

(0.736)

(0.753)

(0.771)

(0.732)

*

*

**

*

*

OBP

3.337
(1.478)

3.281
(1.492)

3.868
(1.432)

3.518
(1.453)

3.422
(1.498)

3.541*
(1.411)

AB

0.00280***

0.00281***

0.00285***

0.00278***

0.00273***

0.00277***

SB

(0.000284)
0.00385

(0.000286)
0.00364

(0.000273)
0.0000597

(0.000279)
0.00162

(0.000325)
0.00403

(0.000271)
0.000403

(0.00419)

(0.00424)

(0.00425)

(0.00426)

(0.00422)

(0.00416)

MIF

0.0941
(0.0586)

0.0911
(0.0593)

0.0532
(0.0582)

0.0964
(0.0575)

0.0866
(0.0612)

0.0351
(0.0593)

Hispanic

-0.129*

-0.124

-0.124*

-0.134*

-0.131*

-0.129*

(0.0632)

(0.0648)

(0.0607)

(0.0621)

(0.0637)

(0.0603)

0.314***

0.314***

0.309***

0.319***

0.315***

0.313***

(0.0287)

(0.0289)

(0.0277)

(0.0283)

(0.0290)

(0.0274)

Total
Seasons
Fielding
Percentage

0.887
(2.018)
0.0108**

DEF

(0.00392)
0.00906*

DRS

(0.00452)

Errors

0.00312
(0.00684)
0.108**

DWAR
Constant
Adjusted R2
N

9.751

***

8.907

***

9.607

***

9.711

***

9.720

***

(0.0367)
9.696***

(0.415)

(1.965)

(0.402)

(0.407)

(0.422)

(0.396)

0.855

0.853

0.866

0.860

0.853

0.868

85

85

85

85

85

85
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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2. Results
a. Equation 6.1
The results of equation 6.1 indicate that the SLG, OBP, AB, Total Seasons, DEF, DRS,
and DWAR variables all have a statistically significant positive effect on player salary offer. The
results also show that the Hispanic variable has a statistically significant negative effect on
player salary offer. All else fixed, a 1% increase in slugging percentage would cause a 4.52%
increase in salary. This result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance.
The results for OBP would indicate that a 1% increase in OBP would cause a 3.34% increase in
player salary offer. This result was found to be significant at the 2.7% level of significance, thus,
at the 5% level of significance I reject the null hypothesis that OBP has no effect on player salary
offer. The results for AB would indicate that an extra 10 AB per year would cause a 2.80%
increase in player salary offer, all else fixed. This result was found to be significant at all
reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year indicate this variable does not have
a statistically significant impact on a player’s salary offer for arbitration filings. The results for
MIF indicate that the positional variable does not have a significant impact on a player’s salary
offer. The results for the Hispanic variable indicate that, all else fixed, a Hispanic player offers a
salary that is 41.8% below other ethnicities. This result was significant at the 4.4% level of
significance, thus at the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ethnicity has no impact on a
player’s salary offer. The results for Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, each addition
season a player plays causes a 31.4% increase in player salary offer for arbitration filings. This
result was significant at all reasonable levels of significance, as such I conclude that this variable
is a significant determinant of a player’s evaluation of his own value. The adjusted r-squared
value of this equation was .855.
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b. Equation 6.2
Fielding percentage was not found to be a significant variable in this equation. The
inclusion of this variable caused the adjusted r-squared value to decline relative to the core
equation. These results indicate that fielding percentage is not a relevant variable in determining
a player’s salary offer for arbitration filings. That being said, the inclusion of this variable did not
alter the coefficient estimates of significant variables relative to the core equation.
c. Equation 6.3
The addition of DEF to the core equation yielded statistically significant results. Recall
that DEF is a measure of fielding runs saved, which includes a positional adjustment. The results
showed that an increase in DEF by one corresponds with a 1.08% increase in player salary offer.
This result was significant at the 0.8% level of significance. This means that at the 5% level, I
reject the null hypothesis that DEF has no impact on salary. The inclusion of this variable also
caused the adjusted r-squared value to increase relative to the core equation, from .855 to .866.
The inclusion of this variable caused a relatively large increase in the estimated coefficient of
OBP, from 3.34 to 3.87. As explained earlier, this is likely caused by a negative correlation
between the two variables. Apart from OBP, DEF did little to alter the coefficient estimates of
the other significant variables relative to the core equation.
d. Equation 6.4
DRS is statistically significant when added to this model. Recall that DRS is a measure of
fielding runs saved, without a positional adjustment. The results show that an increase in DRS by
corresponds with a 0.91% increase in player salary offer. This result was significant at the 4.9%
level of significance. Therefore, at the 5% level of significance, I reject the null hypothesis that
DRS has no impact on salary. The inclusion of this variable caused the r-squared value to
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increase relative to the core equation, from .855 to .860. The inclusion of this variable did little
to alter the coefficient estimates of significant variables relative to the core equation. I conclude
that DRS is a relevant variable in a player’s determination of his salary offer for arbitration
filings.
e. Equation 6.5
The Errors variable is not statistically significant in this equation. Its inclusion caused the
adjusted r-squared value to decline relative to the core equation. As such, I conclude that the
Errors variable is not relevant in a player’s determination of his salary offer for arbitration
filings. However, the inclusion of this variable did little to alter the coefficient estimates of
significant variables relative to the core equation.
f. Equation 6.6
The inclusion of the DWAR variable yields significant results. Recall that DWAR is the
number of wins a player generates with his defensive ability compared to a player of average
ability, and the variable includes a positional adjustment. The results show that an increase in
DWAR corresponds with a 10.8% increase in salary. This result is significant at the 0.8% level
of significance, meaning that at the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that DWAR has no
impact on salary. The inclusion of this variable did little to alter the coefficient estimates of
significant variables relative to the core equation. It also caused the adjusted r-squared value to
increase from .855 to .868. I conclude that the DWAR variable is relevant to a player’s
determination of his salary offer for arbitration filings.
g. Summary of Results
These equations represent one of the three methods of final salary determination for
player’s that file for arbitration. The results reflect how a player evaluates his own value and

78

determines what salary offer to put forward in his arbitration filing. The dependent variable in
these equations is unique, because the salary value is not the product of negotiations, but rather
the product of a what a player finds to be a fair representation of his worth. That note comes with
one caveat, as in making these evaluations, the player is required to be a rational actor. The
reason for this is because if he salary offer is well above what is considered reasonable by an
independent third party, then he is subject to receive a salary determined unilaterally by his team.
Across all equations, the SLG, OBP, AB, Hispanic, and Total Seasons variables were
significant. The defensive variables of DEF, DRS and DWAR were also found to be significant
when individually added to the core equation. The inclusion of DWAR yielded the largest
increase in the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core equation, with DEF not far behind it.
DRS caused an increase in the adjusted r-squared value as well, however, this increase was not
as large in magnitude as the other variables. This is an interesting finding, because the DWAR
and DEF variables include a positional adjustment, while DRS does not. This means the values
of DWAR and DEF are adjusted based upon which position a player plays. In these equations,
this positional adjustment increased the explanatory power of the defensive variable. This result
suggests that the impact defensive ability has on a player’s evaluation of his own value varies by
position.
E. Arbitration Eligible Players-Team Offer
1. Model
As mentioned above, the arbitration eligible dataset can be further segmented between
players that filed for arbitration and those that did not. The sample of players that filed for
arbitration can includes three different dependent variables that must be examined: the final
salary amount settled as a result of the process, the offer made by the player, and the offer made
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by the player. There were 85 players in the dataset that filed for arbitration. This set of equations
will examine team offers, the values put forth by the team at the exchange date prior to
arbitration hearings. This means that the dependent variable does not represent a salary earned by
the player, but rather a team’s evaluation of the player’s worth. The core equation used to
examine this salary determination was the same as the core equation used in previous sections.
This equation includes SLG, OBP, AB, SB, MIF, Latin American, and Total Seasons as the
explanatory variables. In each subsequent regression the defensive variables of fielding
percentage, DEF, DRS, Errors, and DWAR were added individually.
Table 9 includes the summary statistics for salaries in this model. Table 7 includes the
summary of performance statistics of players in the model. A new table was not necessary here,
because the observations in this sample are the same as the sample used in the previous section,
with the exception of the dependent variable of team salary offer, which is included in Table 9.
This section’s dependent variable is the team’s salary offer from the arbitration process. The
trends of this variable indicate that on average, Black players put receive the highest offer value
from their teams, while Hispanic players receive the lowest.
2. Results
a. Equation 7.1
The results of equation 7.1 indicate that the SLG, OBP, AB, Total Seasons, DEF, and
DWAR variables all have a statistically significant positive effect on team salary offer. All else
fixed, a 1% increase in slugging percentage would cause a 4.79% increase in team salary offer.
This result was found to be significant at all reasonable levels of significance. The results for
OBP would indicate that a 1% increase in OBP would cause a 4.14% increase in team salary
offer. This result was found to be significant at the 0.8% level of significance, thus, at the 5%
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Table 13
Arbitration Eligible Players Team Salary Offer
7.1

7.2

7.3

7.4

7.5

7.6

SLG

4.787***

4.768***

4.817***

4.747***

4.789***

4.861***

OBP

(0.791)
4.135**

(0.797)
4.087**

(0.772)
4.583**

(0.788)
4.257**

(0.797)
4.148**

(0.774)
4.291**

(1.525)

(1.540)

(1.502)

(1.522)

(1.548)

(1.493)

AB

0.00346
(0.000293)

0.00347
(0.000295)

0.00350
(0.000286)

0.00344
(0.000292)

0.00345
(0.000336)

0.00343***
(0.000286)

SB

0.00391
(0.00432)

0.00373
(0.00437)

0.000712
(0.00446)

0.00240
(0.00446)

0.00394
(0.00437)

0.00126
(0.00440)

MIF

0.106

0.103

0.0712

0.107

0.105

0.0602

Hispanic

(0.0605)
-0.0104

(0.0612)
-0.00560

(0.0610)
-0.00581

(0.0602)
-0.0136

(0.0632)
-0.0107

(0.0628)
-0.0105

(0.0652)

(0.0669)

(0.0637)

(0.0650)

(0.0658)

(0.0638)

0.342***

0.342***

0.338***

0.346***

0.343***

0.342***

(0.0296)

(0.0298)

(0.0290)

(0.0296)

(0.0299)

(0.0290)

Total
Seasons

***

Fielding
Percentage

***

***

***

***

0.753
(2.083)
0.00907*

DEF

(0.00411)

DRS

0.00612
(0.00474)

Errors

0.000472
(0.00707)
0.0835*

DWAR

(0.0389)

Constant
Adjusted R2
N

***

8.644
(0.428)

0.876
85
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

***

***

***

***

7.928
(2.028)

8.524
(0.421)

8.618
(0.427)

8.640
(0.436)

8.602***
(0.419)

0.875
85

0.882
85

0.877
85

0.874
85

0.882
85

level of significance I reject the null hypothesis that OBP has no effect on player salary offer.
The results for AB would indicate that each additional 10 AB per year would cause a 3.46%
increase in team salary offer, all else fixed. This result was found to be significant at all
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reasonable levels of significance. The results for SB per year indicate this variable does not have
a statistically significant impact on a team’s salary offer for arbitration filings. The results for
MIF indicate that the positional variable does not have a significant impact on a team’s salary
offer. The results for the Hispanic variable are not significant at the 5% level, indicating that
ethnicity does not have a significant effect on a team’s salary offer for arbitration filings. The
results for Total Seasons indicates that, all else fixed, each additional season played causes a
34.2% increase in a team’s salary offer for arbitration filings. This result was significant at all
reasonable levels of significance, as such I conclude that this variable is a significant determinant
of a player’s evaluation of his own value. The adjusted r-squared value of this equation was .876.
b. Equation 7.2
The fielding percentage variable is not significant in this equation, registering a result that was
significant at the 71.9% level when added to the core equation. At the 5% level of significance, I
fail to reject the null hypothesis that fielding percentage has no impact on team salary offer. The
inclusion of this variable caused the adjusted r-squared value to decrease relative to the core
equation. These findings suggest that fielding percentage does not appear to be a relevant
variable that teams consider when making their salary offer for arbitration filings. The addition
of this variable did cause a large decrease in the coefficient estimate of the Constant relative to
the core equation. That being said, including fielding percentage did little to alter the coefficient
estimates of other significant variables in the equation.
c. Equation 7.3
The inclusion of the DEF variable yielded significant results. Recall that DEF is a
measure of runs saved by a player’s defensive ability compared to an average player, including a
positional adjustment. The results show that an in DEF by 1 causes an increase in salary by
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0.91%. DEF was found to be significant at the 3.0% level of significance, thus, I reject the null
hypothesis that DEF does not have an impact on a team’s salary offer for arbitration filings. The
inclusion of this variable also caused the adjusted r-squared value to increase relative to the core
equation from .876 to .882. This finding indicates that the DEF variable is a relevant determinant
of a team’s salary offer. Adding DEF to the equation causes the coefficient estimate of OBP to
increase by .448. That being said, the inclusion of this variable did little to alter the coefficient
estimates of other significant variables.
d. Equation 7.4
Including DRS in the salary determination equation did not yield significant results. DRS
is significant at the 20.0% level of significance. Therefore, at the 5% level, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis that DRS has no impact on team salary offer. However, the inclusion of this variable
did cause a small increase in the adjusted r-squared value relative to the core equation. DRS also
did little to alter the coefficient estimates of statistically significant variables relative to the core
equation. I conclude that DRS is not a relevant variable in a team’s salary offer determination for
arbitration filings.
e. Equation 7.5
The errors variable is not statistically significant in determining the team salary offer, as
it was found to be significant at the 94.7% level of significance. Thus, at the 5% level, I would
fail to reject that the errors variable has an impact on this salary determination. The inclusion of
this variable also caused the adjusted r-squared value to decrease, indicating the addition of an
irrelevant variable. That being said, the errors variable did little to alter the coefficient estimates
of statistically significant variables relative to the core equation.
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f. Equation 7.6
In this equation DWAR is added to the core equation. The addition of this variable
yielded significant results, as DWAR is significant at the 3.5% level of significance. Thus, at the
5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that DWAR has no impact on team salary offer. Recall that
DWAR is measure of how many wins a player generates with his defensive ability compared to a
player of average ability. This statistic includes a positional adjustment. The results show that an
increase in DWAR by one causes an 8.35% increase in team salary offer. The inclusion of this
variable did little to alter the coefficient estimates of statistically significant variables relative to
the core equation. It also caused the adjusted r-squared value to increase from .876 to .882.
Therefore, I conclude that DWAR is a relevant variable used by teams to determine their salary
offer for the arbitration filing process.
g. Summary of Results
These equations examine the factors teams consider when making their decision on how
much to offer a player at the time of arbitration filings. As with the player salary offer variable,
the dependent variable in these equations is unique. It is a salary value that is not the result of a
negotiation process. Teams decide how much to offer players that file for arbitration unilaterally,
and the value they put forward serves as an anchor for future negotiations. That being said, teams
are forced to be rational actors when deciding how much to offer. The reason for this is because
if a team does not offer a value that is perceived to be a reasonable value for the player’s services
by a third party, then the player’s salary will be determined solely by the player. The arbitration
process dictates that if a team does not give a player a fair offer, then the player will receive a
salary equal to his offer, and the team will be unable to impact how much it must pay. The team
must make an offer that is competitive to avoid this scenario.
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The results of these equations show that when making this decision, teams consider the
variables of SLG, OBP, AB, and Total Seasons. Beyond that, they also consider the defensive
variables of DEF and DWAR when making their salary offer determination. The consistent
difference between the statistically significant defensive variables and the ones that are not
significant is once again the positional adjustment. Both DEF and DWAR includes a positional
adjustment, altering their calculation based upon what position a player plays. Both of these
variables caused an equal increase in the adjusted r-squared value when added to the equation.
F. Robustness Tests
I conducted a variety of tests to check for the robustness of the results in this sample. The
first was to include an interaction variable which interacted both the positional and defensive
variables. The results of the inclusion of this variable were not significant and did little to alter
the significance of other coefficient estimates in the model. In short, I conclude that players
within this level of bargaining power are not compensated differently for their defensive ability
based on the position they play. The same result held true when introducing an interaction
variable between race/ethnicity and the defensive metrics. This finding indicates that arbitration
eligible players are not compensated differently for their defensive ability based upon their race
or ethnicity.
The next set of robustness tests centered around holding both year and team effects fixed.
In order to hold team effects fixed, I introduced a binary variable for 29 of the 30 MLB teams
into the model.25 The results from the inclusion of these variables found that none of the
coefficient estimates for these variables were significant, and they did little to alter the
coefficient estimates of other variables in the model. These results indicate that teams do not
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The 30th team was the reference group
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compensate arbitration eligible players in a statistically significant manner. These results held
across the five different models used to analyze salaries for arbitration eligible players.
The final set of robustness tests I ran centered around fixing the effects of the different
years that players signed their contracts. In order to do this, I introduced a binary variable that
indicated the year a player’s contract began. For example, if the players contract began in 2012,
then the Year 2012 variable was equal to one. If the contract began in a different year, then this
variable was equal to zero.26 I included a year binary variable for the 2012, 2013, and 2014
seasons in order to hold fixed different conditions that could change on a yearly basis, such as
MLB popularity and revenues. The results of the inclusion of these variables found that these
variables did little to alter the coefficient estimates of other significant variables in the core
model. The being said, these binary year variables were found to be significant at the 5% level of
significance. This finding indicates that players are compensated differently by year. This finding
led me to conduct an additional Chow test in order to see if there was a significant break in the
data from year to year. The results of this chow test found that within this level of bargaining
power, there is not a significant difference in the salary determination process. This means that
the significance of these yearly binary variables are likely due to the omission of a significant
variable, likely either MLB revenues, or GDP. The important finding from this test was that
when holding the effects of year fixed, the coefficient estimates of the core model did not differ
significantly.
VIII.

Defensive Statistics Discussion

The results across the seven sets of equations indicate that defensive ability’s importance
in the salary determination model differs across different markets within Major League Baseball.

26

2015 was the reference group
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In the free agent market, the DEF, DRS, errors, and DWAR variables are all statistically
significant, indicating that each statistic effects salary. The DEF, DRS, and DWAR variables
have a positive statistically significant impact on salary, while the errors variable has a
statistically significant negative impact. The results for the career fielding percentage variable
indicate that it does not have a statistically significant effect of free agent salary. The primary
difference in the results from the free agent market and the arbitration eligible market is the
significance of the Errors variable, which is not significant is any of the arbitration eligible
player equations. The results indicate that the DRS variable is marginally significant in
arbitration eligible player equations, including being significant in the model for estimating the
player salary offer of players that file for arbitration. However, both the DWAR and DEF
variables are statistically significant in all arbitration player equations, except for the salary
determination model for the settled salary of players that file for arbitration. In that model, none
of the five defensive statistics I examine are statistically significant. The same is true of the
salary determination model for released free agents. From these results, a number of conclusions
concerning defensive ability in the salary determination model emerge.
First, positionally-adjusted defensive statistics are significant in all markets where
negotiations between the team and the player are not constrained. I will explain this conclusion
in two steps, beginning with the conditions under which salary negotiations are constrained. I
mentioned that there were two sets of equations where DWAR and DEF were not statistically
significant. These are in the released free agent market and in the model for determining the
settled salary for players that file for arbitration. Each of these sets of equations estimate a salary
determined under a constrained negotiation process. By constrained negotiation process, I am
referring to a process where the explanatory power of player performance variables is reduced
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because the negotiations are anchored around a value that determined by a separate process. In
the case of released free agents, the anchor value is the league minimum salary for veteran
players. I previously mentioned that the mean salary for released free agent players is less than
one standard deviation away from the league minimum. This suggests that players within this
market receive salaries that do not largely vary from this league minimum salary. The league
minimum salary is determined by the league’s collective bargaining agreement, and is not
dependent on player performance. Since many players in this sample are receiving salaries that
are at or near this league minimum, the explanatory power of their performance statistics is
reduced. This is seen by the fact that only two of the seven explanatory variables in the core
model are statistically significant across all equations. By contrast, in all other markets at least
four variables are significant across all equations. This finding is paired with the fact that the
adjusted r-squared values for equations in this market are the lowest of all markets examined.
This suggests that either there is a problem with the model’s specification, or there is little
correlation between performance statistics and player salaries in this sample.
The other set of equations where defensive statistics were not statistically significant was
the salary determination equations for the settled salary amount of players that filed for
arbitration. Again, this salary value is determined by a constrained negotiation process. All of the
players in this sample filed for arbitration and exchanged salary figures with their team. These
exchanged salary figures represent the upper and lower bounds of the negotiation for the settled
salary amount. For all salaries in this sample that were not determined by an arbitration panel,
the settled salary amount was greater than the team offer and less than the player offer. This
suggests that these values were used in every case as the starting values for the negotiation
process. Defensive statistics are significant in determining each of these starting values, as
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shown by the results of equations 6.1-6.7 and 7.1-7.7. However, the results of the equations that
predict the results of these constrained negotiations show that defensive ability does not have a
significant impact on the outcome of these salary negotiations. As I previously mentioned, this
does not indicate that defensive ability is not determinant of salary for these players that filed for
arbitration. Instead, these results indicate that defensive ability is not a significant determinant of
salary for the final step of the negotiation process. Both the player and the team consider
defensive variables when making their initial offers, but not when negotiating away from these
offers. The results of equations 5.1-5.7 indicate that offensive ability is the primary determinant
of those negotiation outcomes. This process represents a constrained negotiation process.
In all other markets, positionally-adjusted defensive variables are statistically significant
in determining player salary. This indicates that the defensive statistics that serve as the best
predictors of player salaries are the statistics that have their calculations adjusted based upon the
position a player plays. This means that a position, such as shortstop, that has a high volume of
opportunities to make defensive plays relative to other positions, will not have a higher statistical
value due to these extra opportunities. DWAR and DEF adjust based on a player’s defensive
ability relative to other players at his position. This is important because it means these values
can be compared across positions. The DWAR statistic of a second baseman is comparable to the
DWAR statistic of a left fielder because each statistic represents the two player’s defensive
ability relative to the rest of the league. DWAR and DEF place an all else fixed value on each
player’s ability to play defense. This fact is the reason that it makes sense that these two
variables are the defensive measures that are statistically significant across both the free agent
and arbitration markets. From this finding, I conclude that defensive ability is a significant
determinant of player salary in both markets.
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Another conclusion that can be made from the regression results regards the use of both
the errors and fielding percentage variables in the salary determination model. Across all of the
markets examined, fielding percentage is not significantly significant in the salary determination
model. Errors, on the other hand, is only statistically significant in one of seven equations. This
finding is of note considering the importance that is placed on these variables by the MLB.
Major League Baseball keeps a variety of records and statistics during a league baseball game,
among those are: errors, assists, and putouts. All three of these statistics are defined and
explained in the official MLB rulebook. These three statistics also serve as the inputs for the
calculation of fielding percentage. As such, fielding percentage values have been calculated
throughout the history of the MLB, dating back to 1871. The historical presence of this statistic,
along with the errors statistic, likely accounts for its emphasis. Fielding percentage is the only
defensive efficiency statistic that can be calculated from official MLB data. As a result, fielding
percentage is assumed to be telling of a player’s defensive ability. Until the advent of advanced
defensive statistics in the 1980s, fielding percentage was the primary measure of defensive
ability, representing the frequency at which a player successfully completes a defensive play per
attempt. Errors also acted as an important statistic until advanced measures were introduced, as
they indicated the number of unsuccessful attempted defensive plays a player made. However,
the significance of these variables when included in my salary determination equation suggest
that when determining player salary, neither statistic is given careful consideration. This finding
suggests that either fielding percentage and errors make a poor proxy for defensive ability, or
they represent a component of defensive ability that is not considered valuable to teams. In my
opinion, both are correct.
Given the significance of the DEF and DWAR variables in the salary determination
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equations across all levels of bargaining power, it is difficult to look at my results and suggest
that defensive ability does factor into the determination of a player’s salary. On a consistent
basis, these variables had a statistically significant positive effect on salary. DRS was not as
consistent, but it lacked a positional adjustment, as I have previously discussed. It is important to
note that each defensive statistic examined in my equations were serving as a proxy for defensive
ability. Each variable was included to explain variance in salary that was not explained by
variables in the core model. Since the core model did not include any defensive statistics, the
variance explained by the inclusion of the five defensive statistics I examined was hypothesized
to be defensive ability. However, including the fielding percentage and errors variables, in most
cases, did not increase the explanatory power of the equation. With the exception of errors in the
free agent salary determination equation, including fielding percentage and errors caused the
adjusted r-squared value for each equation to either decrease or remain the same relative to the
core equation. This suggests that neither of these two variables were explaining variance in
salary, despite the fact that the results of other defensive variables indicated that some of this
variance is caused by defensive ability. This suggests that both the fielding percentage and errors
variables were a poor proxy for defensive ability. This could be for a variety of reasons, but in
my opinion, it is related to bias created from the calculation method of both variables.
Fielding percentage is calculated by dividing putouts and assists by putouts, assists, and
errors. This suggests that the variable is calculated by dividing number of successfully completed
plays by number of successfully completed plays plus errors. This can cause bias on two fronts.
First, number of successfully completed plays is a function of how many opportunities a player
has to complete a play. The number of opportunities a player has to complete a play is a function
of player position. Players playing in the infield have more opportunities to make defensive plays
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than players playing in the outfield. Thus, the calculation of this statistic is not equal. An
outfielder who commits one error is likely to have a lower fielding percentage than an infielder
who commits one error, because that infielder will have more opportunities obtain putouts and
assists due to his position. This positional bias aside, the determination of the error statistic also
leaves room for bias. In the MLB official rulebook, a player is charged with an error when:
[His] action has assisted the team on offense, as set forth in this Rule 10.12.The official scorer
shall charge an error against any fielder: (1) whose misplay (fumble, muff or wild throw)
prolongs the time at bat of a batter, prolongs the presence on the bases of a runner or permits
a runner to advance one or more bases, unless, in the judgment of the official scorer…If a
ground ball goes through a fielder's legs or a fly ball falls untouched and, in the scorer's
judgment, the fielder could have handled the ball with ordinary effort, the official scorer shall
charge such fielder with an error… For example, the official scorer shall charge an infielder
with an error when a ground ball passes to either side of such infielder if, in the official scorer’s
judgment, a fielder at that position making ordinary effort would have fielded such ground
ball and retired a runner. The official scorer shall charge an outfielder with an error if such
outfielder allows a fly ball to drop to the ground if, in the official scorer’s judgment, an
outfielder at that position making ordinary effort would have caught such fly ball. If a throw
is low, wide or high, or strikes the ground, and a runner reaches base who otherwise would
have been put out by such throw, the official scorer shall charge the player making the throw
with an error (MLB Official Rulebook: Rule 10.12).
The above section is a sample of Rule 10.12 in the MLB Official Rulebook. This rule outlines
the criteria an official MLB scorer uses when determining if an unsuccessful defensive play is
considered an error. The determination of whether or not a play is an error is made by a league
appointed official scorer. The sample of Rule 10.12 replicated above contains four instances
where the rule explicitly states that the official scorer must use their own judgment in
determining whether a player is charged with an error. This suggests that the determination of the
error statistic is subjective, depending on the opinion of a league appointed scorer. The rule
attempts to create a formulaic statistic, as Rule 10.12, in its entirety, outlines the criteria for
scoring nearly any play imaginable. However, errors are still dependent on judgment, leaving
room for bias. It is for these reasons that both errors and fielding percentage serve as poor
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proxies for defensive ability. Both statistical measures, despite being among the only defensive
data collected by Major League Baseball, contain too many sources of bias to used to judge a
player’s ability.
It is unlikely that my previous conclusions concerning both the fielding percentage and
errors statistics are groundbreaking. Previous literature has examined this issue in further detail
(see Kalist et. al, 2006), with results from a macro analysis of official scorer decisions indicating
that official scorers have a bias towards the home team. That being said, these findings are
important to note when considering the overall conclusions from my regression analysis
concerning defensive statistics. This conclusion is that, broadly speaking, defensive ability is a
significant determinant of player salary in Major League Baseball. This is shown by the results
of the equations when the positionally adjusted variables of DWAR and DEF are added to the
core equation. For each of these equations, with the exception of the two markets that include
constrained negotiation processes, the addition of each of these two variables increases the
adjusted r-squared value, along with yielding positive statistically significant coefficient
estimates. These results indicate that, all else fixed, defensive ability has a positive impact on
player salary, regardless of level of player bargaining power.
IX.

Conclusions
From this research, I reached a variety of conclusions regarding the salary determination

process in the MLB. First, when examining player salary, one must first examine player
contracts. This is especially important when matching player performance data to be used to
create a salary determination model. Players can engage in multi-year contracts, which means
they will negotiate their salaries for multiple seasons at once. When analyzing the salary
observations of players that sign a multi-year contract, it is important to only consider a player’s
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performance prior to when the contract was signed. This means that if a player signs a two-year
contract in 2012, his batting average during the 2012 season is not a determinant of his 2013
salary. These adjustments were made during my data collection process, and from this process I
was able to collect data correctly that would yield statistically significant results.
Second, official MLB defensive statistics are not complete indicators of a player’s
defensive ability. This conclusion was explained in detail in the previous section, but it is worth
mentioning again. The results of my regression analysis indicate that defensive ability is a
significant determinant of player salary across all markets and levels of bargaining power. This
was shown by the consistent statistical significance of both the DEF and DWAR variables in five
of my seven sets of regression. In all seven sets of regressions, the fielding percentage variable
was not statistically significant. In six of my seven sets of regressions, the errors variable was not
statistically significant. In a model where the results indicate that defensive ability is an
important determinant of player salary, both the fielding percentage and errors variables were
insignificant.
Third and lastly, my hypothesized effect of defensive variables in the salary
determination model held true. The positionally adjusted defensive variables in my model had a
positive statistically significant effect on player salary for all cases where a conventional
negotiation took place. I mentioned previously that during my literature review I examined 24
different salary determination models. Only eight of those models included a variable that is a
measure of defensive performance. Of those eight models, four of them used fielding percentage
as the defensive statistic of interest. In only one of the four models that used a fielding
percentage variable were the results significant. These results suggest the defensive ability has
largely been ignored during the construction of salary determination models. My results indicate
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that defensive ability cannot be ignored, in fact, failure to include a defensive variable in the
salary determination model could result in omitted variable bias.

95

References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Banaian, King, and Orn Bodvarsson. 1998. "The Value of Arbitration Rights in Major
League Baseball: Implications for Salaries and Discrimination." Quarterly Journal of
Business and Economics 37 (1): 65-80.
Barilla, Anthony. 2002. "An Analysis of Wage Differences in Major League Baseball,
1985-1995." Dissertation, Department of Economics, Kansas State University,
Manhattan.
Baseball Reference. 2015. Player Stats. Accessed December 2015. http://www.baseballreference.com/players/.
Bradbury, John Charles. 2013. "What Is Right With Scully Estimates of a Player’s
Marginal Revenue Product." Journal of Sports Economics 14 (1): 87-96.
Brown, Daniel T. 2008. "Final Offer Arbitration in Major League Baseball: An Empirical
Analysis of Bargaining." Dissertation, University of Delaware, Dover.
Fangraphs. 2015. Defense. Janurary. Accessed December 2015.
http://www.fangraphs.com/library/defense/.
Giles, D. E. . 2011. "Interpreting dummy variables in semi-logarithmic regression models:
exact distributional results." Ecnometrics Working Paper, Department of Economics,
University of Victoria.
Gius , Mark P. , and Timothy R. Hylan. 1999. "Testing For The Effect Of Arbitration On
The Salaries Of Hitters In Major League Baseball: Evidence From Panel Data."
Pennsylvania Economic Review 7.1 20-35.
Haupert, Michael J. . 2007 . The Economic History of Major League Baseball. Edited by
Robert Whaples. December 3. Accessed December 1, 2015 .
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-major-league-baseball/.
Holmes, Paul. 2011. "New Evidence Of Salary Discrimination In Major League Baseball."
Labour Economics 18 (3): 320-331.
Horowitz, , Ira, and Christopher Zappe. 1998. "Thanks For The Memories: Baseball
Veterans' End-Of-Career Salaries." Managerial and Decision Economics 377-382.
Kalist , David, and Stephen Spurr. 2006. "Baseball Errors." Journal of Quantitative
Analysis in Sports 2 (4).
Lahman, Sean. 2015. Download Lahman’s Baseball Database. Accessed January 2016.
http://www.seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/statistics/.
Link, Charles, and Martin Yosifov. 2012. "Contract Length And Salaries Compensating
Wage Differentials In Major League Baseball." Journal of Sports Economics 3-19.
MacDonald, Don N., and Morgan O. Reynolds. 1994. "Are Baseball Players Paid Their
Marginal Products?" Managerial and Decision Economics 15 (5): 443-457.
Major League Baseball. 2011. 2012-2016 Basic Agreement. Accessed January 2016.
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.
—. 2016. Official Baseball Rules-2016 Edition. Accessed March 2016.
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2016/official_baseball_rules.pdf.
Marburger, Daniel R. 1994. "Bargaining Power and the Structure of Salaries in Major
League Baseball." Managerial and Decision Economics 15 (5): 433-441.
Marburger, Daniel R. . 2004. "Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration: Evidence
from Major League Baseball." Economic Inquiry 42 (1): 60-68.
96

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

Marburger, Daniel R. . 1996. "Racial Discrimination And Long-Term Contracts In Major
League Baseball." Review of Black Political Economy 25 (1): 83-94.
Miller, Phillip A. . 2000. "A Theoretical And Empirical Comparison Of Free Agent And
Arbitration-Eligible Salaries Negotiated In Major League Baseball." Southern Economic
Journal 67 (1): 87-104.
Palmer, Matthew C. , and Randall H. King. 2006. "Has Salary Discrimination Really
Disappeared From Major League Baseball?" Eastern Economic Journal 32 (2): 285-297.
Pantuosco, Louis J., and Gary Stone. 2010. "Babe Ruth As A Free Agent: What The OldTime Greats Would Earn In Today's Labor Market For Baseball Players." American
Economist 55 (2): 154-161.
Pedace, Roberto, and Curtis Hall. 2012. "Home Safe: No-Trade Clauses And Player
Salaries In Major League Baseball." Industrial Relations 51 (3): 627-644.
Rockerbie, Duane W. . 2009. "Strategic Free Agency in Baseball." Journal of Sports
Economics 10 (3): 278-291.
Scully, Gerald W. . 1974. "Pay And Performance in Major League Baseball." The
American Economic Review 64 (6): 915-930.
Scully, Gerald W. . 2004. "Player Salary Share And The Distribution Of Player Earnings."
Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (2): 77-86.
Solow, John L., and Anthony C. Krautmann. "Leveling The Playing Field Or Just
Lowering Salaries? The Effects Of Redistribution In Baseball." Recent Developments in
the Economics of Sport. Volume 2. 138-149. n.p.: Elgar Research Collection. The
International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 254. Cheltenham, U.K. and
Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2011. EconLit. Web. 20 Sept. 2015.
Sommers, Paul M. . 1990. "An Empirical Note On Salaries In Major League Baseball."
Social Science Quarterly 71 (4): 861-867.
Stone, Gary, and Louis Pantuosco. 2008. "Estimating Baseball Salary Equations from
1961-2005: A Look at Changes in Major League Compensation." International Journal of
Sport Finance 228-238.
Yosifov, Martin. 2006. "Salary Determination and Contract Length in Major League
Baseball." Dissertation, Economics, University of Delaware.

97

